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ABSTRACT
FIXING THE FAILED: AN EXAMINATION OF TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS AND STATE BUILDING CAPABILITIES
by Joshua Adam Freeman
May 2015
This study examines the role of terrorist organizations in failed states. In
particular, their ability to perform positive state-building activities that result in stability
is investigated. Both terrorism and state failure present unique and serious threats to
international security. However, there is very little literature concerning the positive
effect terrorist organizations can have in failed states. Presented is not only an
investigation of the linkages between state failure and terrorism, but also a new
classification of terrorist organizations based upon their ability to state-build in failed
states. These organizations are classified by their ability to provide goods and services
within the state, become a legitimate sovereign, and provide security from both domestic
and international threats to the citizens of the state in the process of filling either capacity,
legitimacy, and security gaps. From this a tiered classification is built. The FARC,
Hezbollah, and LTTE are examined to ascertain their ability to complete these tasks.
Results show that the FARC is unable to fill any gaps, Hezbollah all three, and the LTTE
only one. Results suggest that there are indeed terrorist organizations that have the
capacity to perform positively. The new classification system allows for study of terrorist
organizations that evaluates them on their constructive abilities, an often overlooked
dimension of their existence. Using this system, new policy to combat the rising terrorist
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threat and the instability surrounding state failure can be developed and put into place to
bring about a more security international system.

iii

DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated in loving memory to my mother, Evednia Marie Freeman.
I am also thankful for my father, James Freeman, who has provided encouragement
throughout my graduate school experience. This thesis is also dedicated to the Brown
family whose encouragement and support has provided me the opportunity to pursue my
academic goals.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank the members of my committee Dr. Joe Weinberg, Dr. Troy
Gibson, and Dr. Marek Steedman. A special thank you goes to my committee chair, Dr.
Joe Weinberg, whose guidance made this project possible. I am also greatly indebted to
my fellow political science graduate students and Juashua for their numerous readthroughs and comments and also to Liz, who provided the needed motivation when I was
struggling to finish this project. A special debt of gratitude goes to my friend and
colleague, William Samuel Adcock, for his numerous comments, read-throughs, and
putting up with my incessant rambling in the office, without him I would have never
reached the completion of this project.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ ii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................. ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..............................................................................................x
CHAPTERS
I.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1

II.

STATE FAILURE .......................................................................................5
What is State Failure?
Civil War. Revolution, and Failed States
Harbingers of Instability
Modeling State Failure
Conclusion

III.

TERRORISM AND THE FAILED STATE..............................................28
Terrorism and the Terrorist Organization
Causes of Terrorism
Terrorism and Failed States
Goods and Services Provision
Conclusion

IV.

CONSTRUCTING A CLASSIFICATION ...............................................48
Filling the Gaps
Constructing the Classifications System
Conclusion

V.

CASE STUDY ...........................................................................................63
FARC
Hezbollah
LTTE
Conclusion
vi

VI.

CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................... 75

APPENDIXES .................................................................................................................. 80
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 83

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1.

Scoring within the Gaps .............................................................................61

2.

Scoring the FARC ......................................................................................65

3.

Scoring Hezbollah ......................................................................................69

4.

Scoring the LTTE ......................................................................................73

viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
1.

Incidence and Prevalence of Political Instability Worldwide ......................7

2.

The Gaps and Conditions for Their Existence1 ...........................................9

3.

Domestic Terrorist Attacks in Fragile State Index Top 10 Versus the Rest
of the World ...............................................................................................39

ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
FARC

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia

GTD

Global Terrorism Data Base

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

LTTE

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

NED

National Endowment for Democracy

NGO

Non-governmental Organization

x

1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis investigates the relationship between failed states and terrorist
organizations. In particular, the ability of terrorist organizations to engage in positive,
state-building activity in failed states is examined. Such examination leads to the
creation of a new classification system for terrorist organizations based upon these
abilities rather than those attributes relied on by other classifications, such as ideology,
area, and fatality rates. Such a classification allows for the development of new, more
strategic policy geared towards eliminating the support base of these organizations rather
than engaging them in physical combat in an attempt to eradicate them.
The primary objective of this study is to reveal whether or not terrorist
organizations can act in a positive manner. To accomplish this goal, terrorist
organizations are evaluated and scored on their ability to meet certain criteria for each of
the gaps presented in the Call (2010) model of state failure. From such evaluation, a new
classification of terrorist organizations is constructed. As the terrorist organizations are
evaluated and classified, a more intimate knowledge is offered that provides the means to
better understand the role of terrorist organizations within their states and the
international system. An investigation of their constructive capabilities provides insight
that studies that simply evaluate their destructive abilities are unable to offer.
I argue that some terrorist organizations are indeed able to act in a positive
manner. Though this activity does not forgive their use of violence against innocent
civilians, it shows that they are capable of performing a number of functions and that
their classification based upon their tactics and fatality rates alone may be inappropriate.
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This thesis calls for a closer look at these organizations and argues that there is more to
them than meets the eye. Further, the rush to label such organizations as inherently evil
has produced ineffective policy and created averse attitudes in global politics that are
detrimental to securing peace for all citizens of the world. Noted during the course of
this investigation is that state sponsorship of these organizations is helpful, but not the
most influential factor pushing these organizations towards taking positive action.
There is a distinction between terrorist organizations and NGOs such as the Red
Cross that must be made, outside of the obvious. The use of coercive force and violence
allows terrorist organizations to be more successful at influencing substantive change
within a state. The failures of NGOs to stabilize failed states in Africa are numerous, and
this is often attributed to their inability to use force. The investigation of terrorist
organizations’ abilities to act in a state-building manner becomes important due to their
distinct use of violence as a coercive tool for this reason.
In the context of this thesis, a failed state is a state that cannot provide the most
basic of goods, services, and security to its citizens at even minimum levels and has lost
the ability to control its internal affairs. When presenting original data, the Fragile States
Index is referenced to draw a list of failed states. Terrorist organizations are any
organization that targets innocent civilians with the intent of coercing someone else into a
political activity. Data regarding terrorist attacks is drawn from the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) published by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism.
The study proceeds as follows. In Chapter II, the phenomena of state failure is
explored and analyzed. Literature regarding the definition of state failure, the
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relationship of state failure to civil war and revolution, the causes of failure, and
appropriate modeling of state failure are analyzed. This chapter also thoroughly explains
the choice to use the Call model as a basis for our understanding of state failure in
attempts to build a classification of terrorist organizations. Analytic treatment is also
given to each of the three gaps as well as the provision of examples of what states fall
into each of the gaps, and which fall into multiple gaps.
Chapter III provides an overview of terrorism and terrorist organizations, and
their relation to state failure. First, a concrete definition of terrorism is laid forth as to
clearly define what constitutes a terrorist organization and what does not. From here, the
causes of terrorism are explored and analyzed, and their relation to state failure
extrapolated upon. The rest of the chapter is devoted to examining terrorist organizations
and goods and services provision within states, both failed and not, and the relationship
between terrorism and failed states. The latter is accomplished through analysis of
terrorist incidents per year cross referenced with listings from the top 10 in the Fragile
States Index.
Chapter IV provides an overview of the classification system to be presented.
Each of the criteria that must be met to fill each of the gaps are explained and detailed
and the build of the classification is presented. Along with each criterion is an example
of a terrorist organization that has fulfilled, or is currently fulfilling, the criteria. The
remainder of the chapter is devoted to discussing the build of the classification system.
The tiered structure of the classification is set forth and detailed.
Chapter V presents case study of various terrorist organizations and their abilities
to fill each of the gaps. The terrorist organizations The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
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Columbia (FARC), Hezbollah, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are
provided as case study. Using these organizations the classification system is put to
practical use and demonstrates its appropriateness and effectiveness. Chapter VI
provides the conclusions of the thesis and prospects for future research.
Results of the study show that the FARC fills no gaps, Hezbollah is able to fill all
three gaps, and the LTTE is able to fill one. Of these three, Hezbollah stands to do the
most good for citizens of the state in which they exist. This is not to say that their use of
terrorist tactics is good, but their provision of services to the people of Lebanon is. The
result associated with Hezbollah shows that terrorist organizations can act in a positive
capacity and do good for the state. This is not a remark to the inherent good or evil
surrounding the decision to commit acts of terrorism, however.
Using the operational understanding of the classification presented, it is hoped
that more research into the abilities of terrorist organizations is conducted in the future.
Through such an intimate understanding of what is considered one of the most grave
threats to international security, policy makers worldwide have at their disposal
information that allows for competent and effective policy solutions to the threat of
terrorism worldwide.
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CHAPTER II
STATE FAILURE
This chapter introduces state failure. Due to its use as a classifying mechanism it
is a key component of this study. The particular model used is clearly laid out and its use
as a classifier explained to provide foundations for commentary in later chapters.
Discussion on the definition of state failure, its difference from civil war and revolution,
its causes, and an appropriate modeling as well as explanation of the model’s components
is offered. The role of poverty, corruption, resource wealth, infrastructural issues,
governmental structure, and ethnic tensions in state failure are investigated.
What is State Failure?
State failure is the collapse of a state’s political structure that leads to an inability
to promote rule and law (King and Zeng 2001). The state loses the ability to act as
expected and becomes engulfed with internal turmoil. State dissolution leads to state
predation, the state’s loss over the use of legitimate coercive power, and the inability, or
unwillingness, to provide citizens with basic security, positive political goods, and
services (Bates 2008; Boas and Jennings 2007; Rotberg 2003). Once political rule and
order have dissipated and the state no longer cares for its citizens, it fails.
State predation and loss of coercive power are the key characteristics of the failed
state (Bates 2008). The loss of coercive power is the most important. Issues that lead to
state failure are numerous, but all ultimately lead to the state’s loss of control over the
territory within its borders. In many authoritarian regimes, the state preys on its citizens,
exhibits widespread corruption, and fails to provide their citizens with goods and
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services, yet do not fail. The lack of failure is attributed to the regime’s maintenance of
their monopoly over the use of coercive power within the territory of the state.
Also, unlike the Authoritarian state, failed states face increased competition
between armed factions for control of the state. Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) argue that
any number of would-be sovereigns begin competing for control over the state once the
standing regime begins to struggle. Events in Syria during 2013 and 2014 provide
evidence of this. While the Assad regime fights to maintain control of the state, armed
insurgent groups attempt to depose him and have taken territory from the state limiting
the reach of the state’s authority. Somalia provides further example. No single group is
able to control the entirety of the state and regions such as Puntland, are controlled by
different regional powers.
Failed states also present unique and troublesome threats to the security of the
international community. Iqbal and Starr (2008) find that failed states have an impact on
the general stability of neighboring states and the region in which they are located.
Importantly, they argue that failure of one state can cause political unrest among the
citizens of a neighboring state. Ungovernable territories such as these offer the necessary
environment for transnational terrorist organizational development consisting of a
network of safe-havens and the inability of police and military forces to effectively
combat these organizations out of the state (Patrick 2007; Piazza 2008). The attacks of
September 11, 2001 led to the realization that transnational terrorist organizations are a
grave and pressing threat.
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Figure 1. Incidence and Prevalence of Political Instability Worldwide, 1955-2003.
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Further, if failed states harbor and provide these terrorist organizations a staging ground,
global leaders must devote their resources to reversing the fate of these states.
state
States such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan are commonly used
as examples of the failed state. There are many more that are failed or in varying degrees
of failure. The Fragile States Index for 2014 places 16 states within its very high and
high alert categories (Fund for Peace 2014). Although these states only represent roughly
9% of the total states in the index, this is still a startling number. Since failure in one
state can spread instability to its neighbors, the problem is not just these 16 states, but
potentially all states that border them as well.
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Between 1955 and 2003, the number of new instances of state failure fluctuated
(Figure 1). There was little to moderate fluctuation, ranging from zero to eight new cases
in any given year. However, the percent of total states facing instability is more
important. There is a steady incline with peaks from the mid-1960s to 1970s and again in
the late 1980s and the early 1990s with a sudden drop going into the 2000s. A low of 5%
in 1955 ranged to a high of nearly 30% in the early 1990s. There are a number of
explanations for why there were sudden rises and declines, but exploring these is outside
the scope of this study. This points out that state failure plagues a number of states, even
if only for short amounts of time.
Goldstone et al. (2005) also find that nearly 60% of instability events occurred
within two geographic regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and South Asia.1
Of all instability episodes between 1955 and 2003, 34.8% occurred in Sub-Saharan
Africa and 22.7% in the Near East and South Asia. While other regions suffer instability,
these two regions appear to be particularly troubling. In particular, instability events in
Africa have led to the massacre of millions of innocent civilians in the midst of severe
civil war in a number of states. Instability has also become prevalent in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Syria in the last decade leading to the outbreak of civil wars and internal strife.
Problematically, a large portion of the studies regarding failed states are aimed at
prediction and policy solutions rather than systemically exploring the issue to explain it
(Bates 2008; Patrick 2007). This chapter uses available literature to present a clear image
of the conditions surrounding state failure as well as present a conceptualization that

1

For purposes of the study, the Near East and South Asia were treated as one geographic region.

9
allows us to accurately explore not only state failure, but also to provide the means to
develop policy solutions that are so vehemently desired.
Civil War, Revolution, and Failed States
Civil war is less a cause of state failure than a secondary consequence of the
factors that induce failure. Although many failed states are rife with civil conflict that is
exacerbated by ethnic, religious, linguistic, or some other enmity between communities,
one must be careful not to assume that civil war is an intrinsic trait of state failure (Potter
2014; Rotberg 2002a; Rotberg 2003). Tensions such as these do make it more likely that
state-breaking conflict will occur.
Throughout history, states have experienced large-scale civil war yet did not fail
during the war or in its aftermath. For example, the American Civil War did not bring
the United States to the precipice of state failure – in fact, quite the opposite happened.
The United States maintained control, and in the aftermath of the war, quickly
reassimilated those states that had seceded. Ndulu et al. (2007) find in study of African
states that there are many cases in which the state failed without the presence of civil war
before, during, or after failure. This is a surprising finding. Because there are a number
of similar causes of civil war and state failure, expectation is that civil war would be
present in a majority of failed states. The answer to this puzzle is quite simple, however.
While the conditions may be favorable for civil war to take place, there is a chance it will
not happen or that there is an antecedent variable preventing its start.
Political revolution and state failure are not intertwined either. The two are
separated from similarity on the most basic of levels. Failure is the state’s fall into
disorder while revolution within the state is for the creation of new order. Skocpol
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(1979) argues that revolutions are attempts to reshape the models of state production in
an attempt to enrich the state. This is a difference that must be noted as revolutions take
place in multiple states without failure occurring. Egypt underwent a revolution in 2011
to ouster the standing regime and replaced it with a new, democratically elected regime.
During the revolution, the state was not in any threat of failure. However, in the case of
both revolution and failure, a state may see an explosion of violent activity. We cannot
assume they are correlated with one another, however.
Civil war stems from similar issues that bring about state failure. Because of this,
many studies of state failure are heavily inclusive of literature on civil war. The use of
this literature allows for not only the development of new theories about state failure to
be built, but to also provide further insight into political instability. Without this
literature, the study of state failure would not be as progressed as it is and would most
likely produce trivial results. Political revolution should not be associated with failure
because the goal of revolution is to establish a new, more legitimate order while failure is
the state’s fall into disorder.
Harbingers of Instability
When evaluating the causes of state failure, three broad categories must be
examined; economic, governmental, and social issues. Economically, GDP, GDP per
capita, and resource wealth in states is examined. Studies look to the structure of the
government and the regime type, corruption within the state, and the overall
infrastructural stability when evaluating governmental causes. Social issues such as
ethnic tensions are also taken into account. Any of these issues, or any combination
thereof, may produce instability that can lead to the failure of a state.
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Poverty and political instability have a strong relationship. During state failure,
economic and living conditions rapidly decline for the inhabitants of the state (Rotberg
2002a; 2002b). There is an increased likelihood that the state will face instability that can
lead to failure as per capita income falls (Goldstone et al. 2005; Sambanis and Hegre
2006). Fearon and Laitin (2003) concur, as they find that a drop of $1,000 in per capita
income is met with a 42% increased chance of civil war breaking out and Alesina and
Perotti (1995) argue that as the gap widens between the rich and the poor instability is
more likely. As citizens’ income drops, they become desperate and can easily be
attracted to anti-government groups that are able to offer them prospects for a more
bearable life and a promising future.
Poverty of the state itself is also troubling. States that are impoverished find
themselves unable to adequately pay civil servants, the military, and police forces leading
to their loss of coercive power within the state (Bates 2008). Without the loyalty of
military or police forces, the state is helpless but to watch as other would-be sovereigns
begin to encroach and claim loyalties that are lost. Once loyalties begin to shift, the
standing regime of the state begins to self-implode and what were once solid
underpinnings of the state become severely weakened. While not a case of state failure,
Egypt provides a perfect example of this. Even though extremely corrupt, Hosni
Mubarak was able to retain political power for a period of time. He lost the loyalties of
the police and military forces in 2011 and was soon after removed from office and
replaced.
Resource wealth within a state may also lead to stability issues. Resource rich
states face both a heightened risk of civil war, and the likelihood of long and drawn out
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conflict is increased if civil war is to break out (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Ross 2004). Nuedorfer and Theuerkauf (2014) provide evidence to support
this as they find that gains from resources are likely to accrue disproportionately to
certain groups while others are forced to extract the resources with little or no personal
gain. Economic inequality within a state will rise and, as the state hordes the revenues
from the resources without properly distributing them, the state income will concentrate
with only the elites of the state and plunge the poor even further into poverty. Fjelde
(2009) argues that corrupt channeling of resource wealth does provide the circumstances
in which opposition groups are able to easily recruit and grow. With revenues
aggregating so disproportionately, the shadow of instability looms ominously over the
state.
These resources become even more valuable during conflict as they allow the
state to maintain a position of superiority and, if opposition movements take control and
manage them, the income necessary for continued engagement with the state flows into
their coffers. Naturally, the more valuable the resource, the more likely that conflict
surrounding it will arise. Many states have access to resources such as ferrous metals,
gemstones, and oil, for example. These resources constitute a large portion of the state’s
income. Problematically, a small portion of the population often take control of the
revenues accrued from these resources.
Of all valuable resources, petroleum provides the most potential for civil conflict
and instability (Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thies (2010) confirms this and
argues that oil exports stand apart from state capacity, unlike many other tested primary
export resources. Furthermore, oil is the only resource that has an effect on the
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likelihood of civil war. This is attributed to a number of factors. First, states with oil are
often much less reliant on their citizens for financial support and are able to rule more
repressively without major consequence (Bates 2008). Also, because there is high global
demand for oil, much more so than most ferrous metals or gems, states are sure to amass
impressive profits and, if mismanaged or handled by corrupt hands, tensions are sure to
increase within the state.
As the political structures of the state degrade, corruption spreads nearly
uncontrollably. In a number of failing states, leaders begin subverting democratic norms,
discriminating against some groups while showing favor to others, and using their power
to levy resources for their personal use, and use their power to make the lives of those
they rule miserable (Bates 2008; Rotberg 2002b). Moreover, as corruption spreads, the
amount of social welfare offered by the state begins to rapidly decline, and state aid to the
needy ceases (Fredriksson and Svenson 2003). The corruption of both national and local
political leaders leads to a decreased interest in the welfare of the citizenry of the state
and instills greed that ensures that the lives of the political elite are comfortable while the
rest of the citizens of the state struggles to survive.
Corruption, however, does not exist solely at the top of the political structure, it
trickles down riddling the entire structure with corruption. As corruption spreads and
eventually infects the ranks of the police and military, the citizens become victim of state
predation and are offered very few, if any, protections. In Somalia, Mohammed Farrah
Aidid would send his personal guard and militia to secure supply drops from the United
Nations to keep it away from citizens to be used as a mechanism of social control. When

14
the government starts denying citizens access to resources necessary for survival,
tensions rise and the foundations of the state begin to buckle under pressure.
Regimes lose their legitimacy and citizens of the state begin to lose faith in state
institutions. The state’s ability to properly function as a protectorate and provider is
questioned as corruption continues to spread. Choi (2011) argues that as citizens lose
faith in the state, there is a higher chance that they will join terrorist organizations or
some other type of separatist movement that opposes the state. Naturally, as more
opposition movements rise to challenge the regime, the less stable the foundations it
stands on become. Loss of legitimacy bring about intense challenges to the authority of
the state that exposes further corruption and/or provides the conditions for total political
upheaval.
Cruz-Coke (2001) finds in study of Latin American states, that as public
satisfaction in the state dropped, it became much more likely that the state would face
some sort of stability issues. Drops in satisfaction only have profound effects on
democratic regimes, though. Authoritarian leaders often maintain their power through
force and political repression while democratic leaders rely on the people for support to
continue holding their offices, and through those offices, their power. Through use of the
Polity index, Hegre et al. (2001) argue that both strong autocracies and strong
democracies are much less likely to face instability issues than states that fall into the
median categories, otherwise known as anocracies.2 These states have an inherent
instability about them already and often lack the necessary infrastructure to ward off
instability.
2
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In anocracies, even if the government is democratic or transitioning to a
democracy, there is still some probability that they are restricting the political freedoms
of their citizens. Abadie (2006) finds that a lack of political freedom is significantly and
positively correlated with the chances of an increased terrorist presence within a state.
Taking this as a proxy for oppositional movement against the established state
government, one sees that political repression does have an effect on the stability of the
state.
Oppositional movements arise in a number of states but many are too small to be
significant, or lack the resources needed to engage the state long term. When one of
these groups begins using terrorism or guerrilla warfare as a tactic to claim territories and
influence politics within the state, the state faces a more significant challenge than just
appeasing upset citizens. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find in study of terrorist
organizations that territorial control makes the organization much more lethal, and gives
them the ability to oppose the state in drawn out conflict. Without appropriate military
and police forces, the state cannot fight them off. As the state loses control over its
territory and allows outside invaders or domestic enemies to take it, the state’s sphere of
influence shrinks and it loses control.
With the foundations of the state failing, numerous infrastructural issues begin to
surface. Either the infrastructure crumbles or it is taken over by non-state actors. The
lack of roads, rail lines, and telephone and postal communications begin to plague the
state (Englehart 2009). A multitude of challenges arise due to these issues. First, the
ability of the state to deploy troops and police to maintain law and order within its
borders is hindered. Central warning systems and responses to natural disasters and
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public emergencies are also drastically impaired. With the state unable to provide these
services, it becomes easier for non-state actors to step in and provide for the people and
recruit them to their cause.
It also becomes easy for non-state groups to take control of the internal workings
of the state and rule through various indirect channels. For instance, the Taliban were
able to take control of major roadways and villages throughout Afghanistan and become
the de facto rulers of the state. Combined with control over key resources, this allowed
them to easily subvert the standing regime and create mass instability from within. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebels from both inside and outside of the state have
managed to plunder the ferrous metals, precious gems, and forests in the state. They have
also managed to control a number of primary transport roads that allow them to moderate
trade of these resources and keep a government presence from interfering with their
activities.
With the state unable to effectively mobilize troops and the police to deal with
crises, security is compromised. The primary job of the state is to provide citizens with
security from cross-border invasions, loss of state controlled territory, eliminate threats to
domestic security and prevent crime but in failure they are unable to provide minimal
security much less accomplish the before mentioned (Call 2010; Rotberg 2003). States
that are unable to repel outside invaders leave their citizens exceptionally vulnerable and
allow for domestic and international actors to gain power and take territory. In many
cases, civilians are massacred or exploited by the invading forces.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo lacks a central government and is unable
to repel the invasions of numerous outside militant groups. Armed groups from Burundi,
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Rwanda, and Uganda have infiltrated the state and taken over key resources, massacred
millions of state citizens, and control large swaths of territory through the use of violence
and fear. Many other failed states are also unable to combat the rise of armed rebellion
groups that challenge the central authority of the state.
But what induces rebellion against the state? Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue
that it is not grievance, but greed, that will induce someone to rebel against the state.
They argue that in societies that are poor, it is easier to entice citizens to join armed
forces and challenge the stability of the state. Further, as the citizens of the state become
desperate, they are more likely to be influenced by the ideologies of local demagogues
and hatemongers leading to anti-state activities (Krasner and Pascual 2005). With there
being a perceived benefit to joining anti-state movements and groups, citizens who are
impoverished are much more likely to join even if they do not agree with many of their
ideological stances.
Although hatemongering serves to exacerbate existing ethnic tensions within the
state that can lead to civil war, studies find that these tensions are not active predictors of
the outbreak of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However,
research does show that rule by a minority group that is particularly forceful and violent
towards the majority increases the chance of state failure (Collier et al. 2007). The
tensions that build lead to catastrophic events such as the Rwandan Genocide.
In many cases, minorities were chosen by colonial powers as favorites and often
remained in power after the colonial powers withdrew. Also, a corrupt dictator or
authoritarian regime may have favored them. In Iraq, the Baath regime of Saddam
Hussein was made up of the minority Sunnis. The regime was merciless and left the
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majority Shia population living in fear for their lives. Aided by the invasion of United
States troops in 2003, the Shia began to rise up against the regime and it was eventually
toppled, throwing the state into its current situation of on again, off again stability with
intense conflict between the two sects.
Failed states are states in which the central authority has collapsed and no longer
holds the monopoly over the use of coercive force. State failure derives from a number
of factors. Widespread poverty of the state and its citizens, resource wealth, a lack of
security, infrastructural issues, and corruption provide the instability needed to cause
failure. Civil war is not a predictor of the state failing, but is closely associated with
many of the ailments failed states suffer, and, as a result, a number of failed states are
engulfed in civil war.
Modeling State Failure
The study of state failure has produced a number of explanations and models.
Problematically, many of these are inefficient and poorly suited to fully explore it and
differentiate cases. The last two decades saw a rush to fund research into state failure
that has resulted in a number of theories that assume all states essentially function in the
same way, even in failure, and have improperly clustered all states facing some sort of
instability into a one-size-fits-all category (Boaz and Jennings 2007; Call
2008; 2010; Patrick 2008). Due to this, cases such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sierra
Leone are treated as equal in their failure. This is not true, however, as each state
experienced different shortcomings that led to their failure.
Taylor (2014) argues that because state failure can be attributed to no single cause
in particular, our understandings are muddled by ambiguity due to complex relationships
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Figure 2. The Gaps and Conditions for Their Existence.
between variables we attribute to numerous failed states throughout the world. This
ambiguity is enough to dismiss many of these explanations. A list of the causes of failure
exists but very few take the time to examine the nuances and intricacies of failure as they
relate to individual cases. It is proper to continue defining state failure as the collapse of
a state’s government but the one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate. Disambiguation
of these states is pertinent to understanding failure and its surrounding conditions.
Call (2010) presents a new model of state failure using what he refers to as gaps
to address this (Figure 2). In his model, there are three existing gaps: capacity,
legitimacy, and security. He argues that by separating states out using these gaps, we are
able to more appropriately study them as the unique cases they are. Each gap is separated
from the other two, but it is possible for two or even all three of the gaps to overlap in a
failed state. The gaps are not conflated, but are interrelated.
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A model such as this has a number of advantages. Separation of states by the
gaps provides unique insight into the particular problems that plague the state.
Disaggregation allows us to diagnose the ailment, not just the symptoms. Further, this
allows for new definitions and conceptualizations to arise. As many of the current
understandings are riddled with ambiguity, disaggregation allows for a refreshing
examination of state failure that leads to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon and
each individual, unique case.
The Gaps
Each of the gaps presents a set of unique circumstances. One must be careful to
note, however, that there are cross-gap symptoms that could cause failure. This section
explores each of the three gaps and provides examples of states that are in or have been in
the gap. Later, analysis of the crossover between the gaps is performed. Just because a
state falls within a gap does not mean it is failed or failing. However, all failed or failing
states will fall into one or more of these gaps.3
Capacity
The capacity gap refers to the state’s ability to render political goods and services,
maintain infrastructure, and maintain economic stability. All states are expected to
provide certain political goods and services to their citizens to at least a minimal degree,
such as: social welfare, medical care, food, water, open participation in democratic
elections, and access to roads, highways, and railways. According to Call (2010)’s
3

To place states in each of the gaps, Call (2010) employs various methods to rate states. For the capacity
gap he uses immunization rates, for legitimacy a combination of political rights and freedoms and Polity,
and for security a measure of conflict and its intensity. While I have reservations about some of these
measures, and due to a lack of time and resources, I accept his rankings and employ them to place states
within the correct gaps. To account for my reservations, I compare these rankings with those of the Fragile
States Index to examine whether the weakest states appear in any of Call’s rankings.
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rankings, states such as Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Somalia are the top three states in
the capacity gap.
In the late 1980s many of the highways and trade routes in Afghanistan were
controlled by a number of different warlords. The state had no control over these routes.
By holding such integral pieces of state infrastructure, the warlords were able to stagnate
the state economy by seizing all trade goods and even people from these routes. They
were able to restrict aid and relief to the most rural areas of the state by controlling
roadways, leaving citizens highly impoverished and in desperate situations. The citizens
were left to fend for themselves with no help from the state. It was not until the Taliban
took over in the 1990s and secured all these routes and unified them under their control
that everyone had access, for a toll, of course.
Another example is Somalia. Although there is a standing state government in
Somalia, it has little to no control within the borders of the state. Chowdhury and Duvall
(2014) point out that local tribes serve as the sovereign authorities and rule various
regions from within, such as Somaliland and Puntland. The state government is unable to
control the capital of Mogadishu, let alone the entirety of the state. Access to roads,
railways, communications, and much more are out of the state’s control. The state is
unable to provide goods and services to the citizens living within these regions, but the
regional sovereigns do, to some extent. This serves not only to place the state in the
capacity gap, but also within the legitimacy gap as there is credible challenge to the
legitimacy of the state government.
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Legitimacy
The legitimacy gap occurs when the state government is no longer viewed as the
authority within the state’s borders. Authority within the state derives from the
monopoly over the legitimate use of coercive force within the state’s borders (Weber
1964). The state’s loss over the legitimate use of coercive force leads to loss in
legitimacy and control within the state. As the state government loses control, the
stability of the state wanes and legitimacy comes into question.
Corruption also overtakes the state and the citizens lose confidence in the ability
of the standing regime to competently and fairly rule. In a large number of failed states,
leaders become tyrannical and despotic, and use their power to keep themselves wealthy
while repressing others. Call (2010) argues that the legitimacy gap emerges when leaders
begin operating outside the regulations of their power and begin disproportionately
distributing wealth and resources. The legitimacy in question is internal, not external.4
While external legitimacy is key for acting in the international system, it is not of great
importance to rule within a state and this study focuses on the internal variety.
According to Call’s rankings North Korea is the least legitimate state. North
Korea, however, is not a failed state nor is it in the process of failing. A lack of
legitimacy can spark internal uprising that would lead to the overthrow of the state, or as
we see in Somalia, regional sovereigns appearing and ruling on their own without
influence or interference from the state. Many Authoritarian states lack internal
legitimacy yet do not fail. Their ability to continue holding the monopoly over the use of

4

Internal legitimacy is legitimacy granted by the people within the state. External is legitimacy granted by
other sovereign nations to recognize an actor as capable of performing activities expected of an established
state.
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legitimate coercive force and their claim to sovereignty counteracts the lack of
legitimacy.
The presence of mass protests and anger towards a regime signals a legitimacy
gap. The defection of military and police personnel can cement the gap and bring about
the fall of the state. Egypt serves as a perfect example of this. Nepstad (2013) argues
that the Egyptian military and police, when deployed by Mubarak to put down the
protests, instead protected protestors from police brutality, and then, when deployed at a
later date, refused to shoot at protestors. Eventually, the military pulled their support
from the Mubarak regime and sided with the protestors. At this point, Mubarak fled from
the state and the military took control. With the entire institution shifting loyalties, the
regime had no way to enforce their idea of order upon the protestors. This particular
example shows a legitimacy gap appearing and disappearing within a short period of
time. Forays into this gap can be extended over a number of decades though.
Security
The security gap refers to a state’s inability to provide its citizens with minimal
security and its inability to safeguard its borders from domestic and transnational enemies
(Call 2010). States in this gap are often subject to long and drawn out conflicts that leave
the state and its citizens vulnerable. Threats to the security of the state arise from both
domestic and international threats. They range from invading enemy armies, to private
militias, and armed resistance groups. When the state is no longer able to effectively
protect citizens of the state from threats such as this, the state enters into the security gap.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a state that has failed in many aspects.
Its record of providing security is more atrocious than its overwhelming lack of goods
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and services to citizens. Regularly, armed domestic and international groups kill
civilians, plunder resources, and control roads and other means of transportation. The
state has no ability to provide defense against these groups at all. Similarly, the Somali
state government is unable to defend and police the capital of Mogadishu, let alone the
entirety of the state’s territory.
Afghanistan serves as another example. Both before the Taliban took over and
after their overthrow by the United States, Afghanistan was subject to the control of
various warlords. Citizens were subject to their desires and were offered no protections
from their indiscretions. The Taliban did not treat them as well as would be expected by
a state government, but they did provide basic protections and took control from the
warlords unifying much of the state.
The three above mentioned states rank as the top three most insecure states (Call
2010). There is a gross lack of security provided to citizens and in some cases the state is
preying on them. Just because the state has a standing military and police force it does
not exempt itself from the security gap. If these institutions are weak and their loyalties
are ephemeral, it becomes easy for the state to lose control and become insecure.
Not Conflated, but Interrelated
Each of the gaps has an identity that is separate from the other two. This does not
imply that there is not a relationship between the gaps or that they don’t share similar
onsets, however. In fact, there is reason to assume that the presence of one gap will elicit
the appearance of another in the future if not addressed properly. Briefly, these
relationships are discussed. This crossover is not important in terms of scoring criteria
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for filling each of the gaps as presented later, but this does provide insight into how state
failure grows into a larger problem as time goes by and it is left unchecked.
The capacity gap is an inability to provide goods and services and maintain
infrastructure at even minimum levels. This leads to widespread poverty, dissatisfaction,
and anger. It becomes harder for the state to maintain the status quo and keep the citizens
of the state satisfied as conditions such as these arise. If the citizens resort to rebellion, or
even appeal to an outside source for help, the security of the state becomes ineffective
and compromised. With the state engaging its own citizens, it becomes easier for an
outside invading force to move in, such as in the Congo. As the state is unable to fulfill
its role as a provider, citizens will begin to question its legitimacy, and even challenge it.
As a new would-be sovereign rises to face the standing regime, legitimacy is put into
question and the state can enter into a legitimacy gap. If left unchecked, it is easy for a
capacity gap to induce other gaps in the state as well.
As the state becomes less legitimate and corruption begins swirling, the state can
stop providing citizens with goods and services and begin hoarding resources for their
personal use to ensure their own safety. As the legitimacy of the state declines, it
becomes much more likely that an internal, or even external force will engage in warfare
with the standing regime to become the sovereign within the state, much the same as the
Taliban in Afghanistan. There is also the threat that external states, mainly global
superpowers who send aid money to states, will pull their support and quit providing
resources, plunging the state into a severe capacity gap if the state is reliant on that aid.
As the security gap widens in a state, the state potentially cannot provide goods
and services to its citizens. As threats arise and begin taking territory and resource
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wealth from the state, there is little it can do to provide for citizens. The corruption
reduces goods provisions as leaders begin to protect their own instead of the state and
hoard resources for their private use. In turn, citizens begin questioning the legitimacy of
the state and its competence to rule. Therefore, the security gap has provided the
instability needed to open both a capacity and legitimacy gap.
The amount of interrelation between the gaps is alarming. Importantly, however,
we must remember that a state can still reside in a capacity gap without once facing
another of the gaps, and vice versa. This relationship must be noted due to the impact
they can have outside of their own set of symptoms. Through an understanding of the
relationships between the gaps the significance of each gap is drawn more into focus.
Realizing that each of these gaps can set the conditions for another to open, the
importance of policy to eliminate a gap within a state before conditions become worse
and the state faces two or even all three gaps at once becomes abundantly apparent.
Conclusion
State failure poses grave threats on both the domestic and international level. As
states are unable to maintain internal stability, their neighbors can face instability issues
and a number of global security threats can arise. Through Call’s model of state failure,
we are allowed the opportunity to view each case of failure as unique and exclusive.
Using this we can formulate competent policy to combat the symptoms that arise with
each of the gaps and address them before they grow too large.
The Call model is used and repurposed for the task of building a classification of
terrorist organizations based upon their ability to fill these gaps. Throughout the study,
various criteria are set forth that a terrorist organization can meet to be classified with an
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ability to fill it. It is neither the purpose nor intention of this study to produce a new
model for state failure, but instead to use an existing model to further our understanding
of both state failure and terrorists in the failed state.
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CHAPTER III
TERRORISM AND THE FAILED STATE
NGOs such as the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) operate worldwide. They, however, have not had
long-lasting, positive results. A number of NGOs attempt to aid failed states but often
fall short of accomplishing their goals (Zaidi 1999). Problematically, these organizations
lack the ability to use coercive force in order to enforce their agenda, and are constrained
by the limitations the host state places upon them. Terrorist organizations do not face this
issue however. They are freely able to use violence to further their agenda. The lack of
constraints regarding violence makes these organizations more likely to be taken
seriously within state politics and draws the focus of this study.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce terrorism and its relation to state
failure. First, a clear and concise definition of terrorism is offered as to build an
understanding of what a terrorist organization is. Next, an overview of some of the root
causes of terrorism and their similarities to the causes of state failure is provided. The
ability of terrorist organizations to provide positive political goods to the citizens of the
state is also analyzed. The chapter concludes with an investigation of terrorism in failed
states and implications not only for this study, but also future research surrounding the
relationship between two topics.
Terrorism and the Terrorist Organization
The study of terrorism has resulted in a plethora of definitions of terrorism. For
this thesis, an amalgam of the definitions offered by Ganor (2010) and Primoratz (2013)
is employed. Primoratz argues that terrorism is an act of violence, or threat of its use,
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against innocent people, to coerce another person into an action they might not otherwise
take. Ganor shares this view but adds that all terrorist acts are motivated by a political
goal. By combining key aspects of their definitions, the result is that terrorism is the
deliberate use of violence against innocent people with the intent of intimidating some
other person/s into a course of political action in which they would otherwise not take.
The targets do not have to die, they simply must be attacked.
Importantly, this definition provides that there are two targets of a terrorist attack,
a direct and indirect target. The direct target is the innocent people attacked and the
indirect are those that the terrorists are trying to coerce into a political act (i.e. a politician
or ruler). There must also be a political motive behind the attack. Attacks attempting to
accomplish goals such as extorting money are simply criminal acts, not terrorism (Enders
et al. 2011). This is not to say that terrorists do not engage in criminal activities, just that
these activities are not terrorism, even if perpetrated by terrorist organizations. However,
once a criminal organization commits a terrorist act, they are no longer simply criminals.
Terrorist attacks take on one of two primary distinctions, domestic and
transnational. Domestic terrorism is a home-directed act of terrorism that involves only
the members of the state involved while transnational attacks involve the citizens of
multiple states, regardless of the attack location and nationality of the terrorists involved
(Santifort et al. 2012). This is an important distinction to be made as it influences attack
types, targets, and the motivations behind the attacks. Although the overwhelming
majority of terrorist attacks are domestic in nature, a great deal of the research done into
terrorism focuses on transnational terrorist incidents.
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Organizations approach the decision to commit a terrorist act with goals such as
regime changes, policy change, self-determination and autonomy, social revolution, and
maintenance of the status quo in mind (Acosta 2014; Kydd and Walter 2006). The LTTE
in Sri Lanka, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
exhibit the pursuit of such goals. In many cases, an organization will resort to terrorist
activity because they lack the means to nonviolently achieve their desired goals. These
tactics rarely accomplish the goal the organization has in mind and often serve to inflame
tensions between opposing factions though (Acosta 2014).
The resort to terrorist activity is due to a numerical inferiority, limited firepower,
and a severe lack of resources in comparison to the state’s defense and national security
apparatuses, meaning they have no other option but to engage in clandestine operations
(Crenshaw 1983; Hoffman 2006). Tactics of these groups include kidnappings,
assassinations, bombings, hijackings, and suicide bombings (Enders et al. 2011).5 These
tactics draw the ire of established state governments and international authorities while
presenting security issues not as easily prepared for as conventional warfare. Coupled
with the fact that these attacks are carried out against innocent civilians, they are
considered to be illegitimate and in violation of the rules of war.
There is further distinction between terrorist organizations that must be addressed.
Their goals often take on a benevolent or malevolent nature. One must be careful,
though, not to take these as insinuating the inherent “good” or “evil” nature of the
organization. This simply means that some organizations work to better the lives of a
5

Suicide bombings are separated from other bomb attacks due to the death of the bomber. Research finds
these attacks to be much more lethal but much more costly for the terrorist organization. Suicide bombings
also have the advantage of having a triggerman carrying no external devices that would draw the suspicions
of authorities.
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community they represent while others work to secure their own political gains through
any means necessary. To distinguish between the benevolent and malevolent, this study
uses Guevara (1960)’s idea that rebels must be concerned about the welfare of the people
and must be fighting to protect and provide for them because they are supposed to
represent the people to delineate the benevolent from the malevolent. Malevolent groups
fail to do this, and suffer from delusions of grandeur and the creation of their own utopian
society.
Hezbollah does not necessarily attack Israeli civilians because they want to
eradicate the Israeli people. Although some in the organization express the desire to do
so, this is not an opinion shared by all in the organization. Many in the organization do
not view Israel as a legitimate state, but do not want to kill all of its citizens. They are
working to secure the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanese state, and are
attempting to defend the citizens of that state through the only means they possess. ISIL,
however, seeks only their own political gain, specifically, that of their leaders. To
accomplish this, they are using terrorism to exterminate those who stand in their way or
those they do not consider to be desirable for their new order.
Although these malevolent organizations may possess the capabilities to fill any
of the three gaps, their doing so is not to the benefit of the state. It is quite often highly
detrimental. These organizations are considered for the purposes of classification, but
their activities and pursuit of their goals often overshadows their capability to state build
because their ultimate goal is state destruction and the establishment of a state only for
those they deem worthy.
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Terrorist organizations are groups that commit acts of violence against innocent
people in order to force someone into a political act. These organizations can be both
domestic and/or transnational in their operational scope. They employ a number of
tactics to achieve their goals, which are political in nature. They do commit criminal acts
(i.e. bank robbery, money laundering, smuggling, etc.) but these activities are not
terroristic in nature, even when committed by a terrorist organization. Terrorist
organizations operate on both a domestic and transnational level. They can be
exclusively one type or they can be both. Since the start of the Global War on Terror, a
number of terrorist organizations have become a mixture of both because of their
targeting of civilians within their own states as well as those from other states. There is
also a benevolent or malevolent nature to their goals and aspirations.
Causes of Terrorism
Studies investigate the relationship between a multitude of variables and the
existence of terrorist activity within a state. These find correlation between a number of
these and terrorist activity.6 For this thesis, however, only a few are outlined and
analyzed because of similarities they share with the causes of state failure. The causes
investigated in this chapter are poverty, government type, and existing ethnic or religious
conflict within a state. These are overarching topics and the nuances of each are explored
and analyzed in greater detail.
Investigation over the role of poverty is often included in studies regarding
terrorism. Although the results of these studies are mixed and sometimes conflicting,

6

Commonly explored variables are poverty, education, religion, ethnic and religious tensions,
democratization, political freedoms, and human rights. For a review see Abadie 2006, Brockhoff et al.
2014, Krueger and Maleckova 2004, Piazza 2006 and 2011.
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there is a distinguishable trend that emerges that can aid in the explanation of poverty’s
link to terrorism. Recent research shows that poverty itself does not significantly impact
the amount of terrorism within a state (Abadie 2006; Krueger and Maleckova 2004;
Piazza 2006). GDP per capita, the commonly used measure for poverty, has a minimal
impact at best on levels of terrorism. This should not be taken to mean that poverty does
not provide the conditions in which terrorism becomes more likely, however. This has
caused researchers to investigate the underlying causes of poverty as a result.
Poverty does create a larger pool of potential recruits for terrorist organizations as
well as increased support for extremism (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Piazza 2011). In
particular, minority economic discrimination and a lack of social welfare policy or a lack
of adherence to such policy are both significantly and robustly related to increases in
terrorist activity (Burgoon 2006; Piazza 2011). For the economically underprivileged,
aligning one’s self with a terrorist organization provides benefits that are otherwise
unobtainable, such as access to food, water, and shelter. Hungry and desperate, people
are much more willing to engage in activity in which they would not engage under other
circumstances.
While poverty itself is not a significant predictor of terrorism, conditions leading
to widespread poverty or discriminatory poverty inflame existing tensions within the state
making it more likely that terrorism will occur. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that drops
in GDP per capita are correlated with sharp increases in the chances of civil war
beginning, as mentioned in the discussion of state failure. They also find that, in the
context of these conflicts, some people are drawn to use insurgency as a tactical choice.
Insurgency itself does not necessarily entail terrorism, but those conducting insurgent
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operations are often inferior to their opponent in terms of numbers and arms and must
resort to clandestine assaults, similar to terrorist organizations.
The governmental structure of a state and its treatment of its citizens also have a
significant effect on the amount of terrorism within a state. Researchers present
conflicting results regarding this. Studies find that both democracies and autocracies
have terrorism-reducing effects (Krieger and Meierrieks 2008; Wilson and Piazza 2013).
Choi (2011) argues that the presence of strong democratic institutions within the state
make it easy for citizens to voice grievances and settle disputes and also serves to deter
terrorist activity. However, this reduction is not necessarily due soley to the state being a
democracy. As states become more democratic, they begin to offer their citizens a wider
array of political rights and freedoms, but states making an initial transition to democracy
may not provide these as well as more established democracies. Increased political rights
and democratic participation are correlated to a decline in the number of terrorist attacks
within the state (Abadie 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks 2008; Li 2005).
There are exceptions to the democracy related reduction in terrorist attacks,
however. Chenoweth (2013) finds that democracies that are poor, meddle in the internal
affairs of other states, or are tied up in territorial conflict are subject to higher amounts of
terrorist activity. The United States is considered one of the strongest democracies in the
world, yet were victim of the September 11, 2001 attacks over their military presence in
the Middle East and their close relationship to a number of state leaders in the region.
Israel is a democratic state, yet they continuously face attacks from Hamas and Hezbollah
over their military presence in the Palestinian territory, the Golan Heights in Syria, and
southern Lebanon. Iraq and Afghanistan were both impoverished at the time of their
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attempted democratization and were met with an onslaught of terrorist activity by those
that opposed the democratic regime and its political ties to the United States.
Afghanistan was also tied up in territorial conflict between warlords, the Taliban, and
other insurgent groups in the state such as al Qaeda.
Authoritarian regimes exhibit a similar trend insofar as states experience less
terrorism the more authoritarian they become. Wilson and Piazza (2013) find that
varying degrees of authoritarianism are associated with decreases in terrorist attacks.
Notably, the supreme power vested in the executive of an authoritarian regime allows for
a quick and harsh response to terrorist activity, or other forms of political and social
uprising. Also, in states in which the state does not hold high regard for the lives of their
citizens, terrorism is less likely. Admittedly, reporting issues are potentially influencing
this result. Brockhoff et al. (2014) suggest that underreporting by authoritarian regimes
leads to the belief that there is a terrorism reducing effecting when there might not be
one. There is no assurance of this, however, so we accept the findings regarding the role
of authoritarianism.
If both democracy and authoritarianism both provide a terrorism reduction effect,
what is happening? We turn to the Polity IV dataset to explain this. With strong and
established autocracies occupying the -10 to -6 range and democracies of the same
strength occupying the 6-10 range, there is a large gap left in which many states reside.
Our attention then must shift to the intermediary categories. The -5 to 5 range
encompasses those states that are transitioning from one regime type to another or are not
fit to be categorized as either an autocracy or a democracy, and are otherwise known as
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anocracies. States falling into this range are more likely to be subject to domestic
terrorist attacks, which is confirmed using data from the GTD.
Jackman and Treier (2008) argue that by squaring the Polity score of a state, the
stronger autocracy or democracy a state is, the higher the score is. Using this, an
effective test is developed to evaluate anocracies. While it is outside the scope of this
study to provide any quantitative analysis regarding terrorism, this concept is still useful.
The new scores can be used as a gauge of how stable the regimes of the state are. When
examining the domestic terrorist attacks from all around the world for each year, it
becomes evident that the majority of these attacks take place in the states that have lower
scores. While this doesn’t serve to give any directed evaluation of democracies and
autocracies, the information gleaned regarding anocratic states is extremely useful, and
builds towards the notion that the states falling into the anocracies range of Polity are
riddled with a number of problems that must be addressed.
Even though many consider it good for a state to transition towards a democratic
regime, these states are much more susceptible to instability, widespread corruption, and
the emergence of state predation. These conditions are favorable to terrorist activity.
Terrorism is a tactical option for those preyed upon by the state and a way to stem the
political corruption of the state by fighting back against what is perceived to be a threat to
the well being of state citizens.
Existing ethnic and religious tensions within a state also fuel increases in
terrorism. Black (2004) argues that terrorism is directed along ethnic or religious lines.
He points out that terrorist organizations often target those of another community and the
attacks are aimed at those with a socially higher standing in the state’s society.
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Interestingly enough, states in which there are high numbers of domestic terrorist attacks
each year, there was a minority group favored by the state government at some point in
the state’s history.
In Iraq, following the collapse of the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, the
majority Shia, who had been subject to systematic repression, began to lash back against
the favored Sunnis. Both sides have since resorted to acts of terrorism to fight each other
leaving the state to teeter on the edge of all out ethnic civil war. The Tamils in Sri Lanka
provide further example. The LTTE use terrorism against the more powerful state
government that was repressive of the minority Tamils in the state. Hamas also acts in
the same capacity against the state of Israel. Although lacking the necessary resources to
engage in all out war with the Israelis, Hamas targets the settlers sent into the Gaza Strip
by Israel and claims to do so on behalf of the repressed Palestinian people.
Ethnic and religious groups become dangerous because they provide ready-made
communities that are easy to appeal to and recruit for nefarious purposes disguised as
altruistic, or commanded in the name of “God”. Linberg (2008) argues that religious
groups are especially useful because actors are more likely to carry out their assigned
duties if others in the group share their faith. Although ideology, both secular and
religious, is a primary driving force and the existence of a dominant ideology in a state
can bring about the genesis of terrorism, there is no evidence to support the notion that
any one ideology is more likely to cause it than another (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011;
Reynal-Querol 2002).
While Fearon and Laitin (2003) point out that religious and ethnic tension are not
significant predictors of civil war onset, one should be aware that they can inflame
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grievances that lead to the use of terrorism by one group against another. Rule by a
particularly cruel and repressive minority population is correlated to an increased chance
of state failure and can also be correlated with an increase in terrorist activity within the
state. The use of religion is still a hotly debated topic in the study of terrorism.
Researchers are unsure of the exact impact it has, but all tend to agree that it is not a
primary motivator of the leadership of these organizations but can influence the decisions
of those lower in the organizational structure.
Terrorism is caused by a number of circumstances. This section outlines only a
few, but these are important when discussing the links between state failure and
terrorism. There is crossover between the two with regards to these causes. This outlines
the necessity for their study together and provides significance to the taxonomy of
terrorist organizations offered in this study.
Terrorism and Failed States
Poverty, government structure, and ethnic and religious tensions are shown to be
indicators of state failure as well as terrorism. These similarities are too important to be
overlooked. Poverty, based upon lack of wealth distribution, discrimination, and state
predation provide the necessary conditions for both state failure and terrorism to arise in
the state. States that fall into the intermediary rankings of the Polity dataset, and those
that are unable to vest complete control in the executive, such as authoritarian regimes,
and those able to ensure political rights for all citizens are more inclined to experience
both. Tensions along ethnic lines signal both as well as making the occurrence of civil
war much more likely. Although this is simply a short and fairly basic comparison of the
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Figure 3. Domestic Terrorist Attacks in Fragile State Index Top 10 versus the rest of the
world.
two phenomena, it is clear that there are strong similarities that point towards the
necessity of understanding their connections.
Piazza (2007, 2008) shows that failed states act as breeding grounds for
transnational terrorist organizations and also, in study of nineteen Middle Eastern states,
that state failure promotes the growth of these organizations. Failed states provide the
people the lack of a strong police force to curtail the organizations, and a nearly
unsolvable maze of safe houses and caches needed for terrorist organizations to take
advantage of. Ungovernable territories such as these allow terrorist organizations to
flourish
lourish and develop their plan of attack with minimal state interference.
For the years 2005
2005-2007, the top 10 states on the Fragile States Index are
analyzed based upon how many domestic terrorist attacks took place within the state.
Data for domestic terrorist
errorist attacks is drawn from the Global Terrorism Database using
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disaggregation criteria set forth in Enders et al. (2011) (Figure 3). 7 These three years are
chosen due to an overlap in the data from both datasets. The Fragile States Index data
only goes back as far as 2005 while the disaggregation data presented by Enders et. al
(2011) only stretches into 2007. The crossover is therefore examined to gain some
insight into the number of terrorist attacks occurring within failed states.
In total, there were 4,041 domestic terrorist attacks in the three-year span. During
this time, 2,041 of these attacks were carried out in states that ranked in the top 10 of the
Fragile States Index in each respective year of the sample.8 Across the sample these
states accounted for an astounding 50% of all domestic terrorist attacks. The Middle East
is the area of operation for an impressive amount of these attacks. In particular, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan exhibit high outputs. Iraq and Afghanistan were attempting to
transition to democracies after decades of authoritarian rule, making the states highly
unstable. Additionally, they lacked the proper infrastructure to maintain a firm grasp on
the internal affairs of the state in this time frame. Splinter cells of al Qaeda appeared
within the states to combat the American presence and the establishment of a government
that they feared would be pro-American and adverse to their cause and ideology.
Pakistan has not failed or endured a strong American military presence, but has been
subject to a number of corrupt state leaders and social uprising and is considered to be a
safe-haven for many terrorist organizations.

7

Domestic attacks are chosen over transnational due to amount of attacks. By using data regarding
domestic terrorist incidents, a larger sample is drawn.
8
The top 10 states from the index included a total of 13 different states with 7 states appearing all 3 years
of the sample. The top 10 included (Those that appeared all 3 years in italics): Afghanistan, Chad, Central
African Republic, Congo, Cote de Ivory, Haiti, Iraq, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and
Zimbabwe
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Terrorist organizations not only reside in these states, they are active within them
as well. Also, in the sample, these states represented only a small portion of the overall
attacks early on, but exponentially increased each year. The presence of U.S. troops
might explain some of this increase, but these are domestic terrorist attacks not targeted
at the U.S. troops. The attacks were carried out against citizens of the state, by citizens of
the state.
States in any of the gaps are conducive to terrorist development and intervention.
The weakened political state allows non-state actors to interact with the citizens of the
state and gain their support through various actions via the state’s lack of control. As the
dissatisfaction in the state rises, the chance that these organizations are successful within
the state increases. Offered is commentary regarding the reasons terrorist organizations
would want to target states in each of the gaps. In the next chapter, a detailed set of
criteria that must be met for filling these gaps is offered.
The presence of a security gap provides an enticing situation for terrorist
organizations to exploit. Without the ability to use military and police to actively and
effectively root out these organizations and break them down, the state is helpless but to
watch as they grow in size and strength and begin to wreak havoc. Terrorist
organizations can flourish with very little to no interference from state authorities as the
state becomes ungovernable. A state lacking an established and overwhelming military
superiority allows terrorist organizations a much greater chance of accomplishing their
goals.
States suffering from a capacity gap are also vulnerable to terrorist organizations
and their tactics. Some terrorist organizations are fully capable of providing goods and
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services the state should be providing, and are willing to do so, although not necessarily
for altruistic motives such as Hezbollah and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. As in
the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorist organizations can successfully secure the
infrastructure of the state and exert control over it. The Taliban had complete control
over the state and was able to build a regime that kept the state stabilized until the U.S.
military overthrew them in the early 2000s. Such activity allows terrorist organizations
the opportunity to subvert the state and gain legitimacy.
Terrorist organizations find a state in the legitimacy gap to be quite enticing as
well. These organizations begin engaging in activities that can win over the loyalties of
the people as the state loses support. Providing an accepting community as well as goods
and services allows a terrorist organization to undermine state authority and siphon away
the legitimacy of the state and build what the people perceive to be a legitimate authority.
Loss of legitimacy triggers concern among the international community that the state is
not capable of acting as it is expected to and helps these organizations gain sympathy
from the outside because they are fighting to remove those that are unwilling to take care
of the citizens.
Both terrorist organizations and failed states present serious security issues for the
international community. Understanding that the two are closely interrelated reveals that
together they present a much more severe threat. There are striking similarities between
the two phenomena. Poverty and its underlying conditions, the type of government and
whether there is corruption and repression, and existing ethnic tensions within a state
induce both. The relationship between the two is significant and further research must be
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devoted to it. Terrorist organizations flourish in the absence of a strong, centralized state.
Provided any of the gaps, terrorist organizations have the potential to be successful.
Goods and Services Provision
When states lacks legitimacy and fail to provide their citizens with positive
political goods and services, and security, it allows non-state actors, such as terrorist
organizations, the opportunity to fill those gaps and gain support. Terrorist organizations
often provide social services such as welfare, medical care, and education as well as
providing political action, emergence relief, and aid, while building an accepting
community for the disenfranchised, alienated, and those with no direction in life
(Abrahms 2008; Berman and Iannaccone 2006; and Grynkewich 2008). Actively
engaging in these activities allows terrorist organizations to embark on hearts-and-minds
campaigns of sorts with the objective of undermining public support for the state and
building a stable support base of their own.
Grynkewich (2008) views the provision of goods and services as a method of
combating the state. She argues that provision of goods serves three primary purposes: it
challenges the legitimacy of the state by showing its failure to adhere to its end of the
social contract, it offers the population another body in which to place their faith, and it
allows the organization to gain a following that rewards in recruits, sympathy for their
cause, and support of all sorts. Engaging in such activity gives the organization the
ability to better combat the state. As the disparity between the state and terrorist
organizations closes, the result is an opportunity for the organization to engage in open
warfare with the state rather than simply relying on clandestine operations.
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There are other benefits to this as well. Acosta (2014) notes that terrorist
organizations very rarely accomplish their goals through terrorist activity alone, and they
must somehow also integrate themselves to become part of the state’s political process.
As they gain the support of citizens in the state, they gain legitimacy for their cause and
are provided the opportunity to actively pursue their goals with a greater chance of
success. Without the ability to integrate into the political structure of the state, some
terrorist organizations have no choice but to continue engaging in terrorist tactics as their
primary form of engagement.
These tactics are much more likely to be successful in democratic states.
Democratic states rely on the people to elect their leaders and vest power in them, and
losses of support are highly detrimental to the state. When examining failed states, one
must be aware that many are not fully autocratic or democratic, and exhibit a mixture of
the best and worst traits of each regime type. These states, especially if more democratic,
would suffer setbacks from losing the support of the people. With the state prone to more
instability than more developed regimes, losing the faith of the citizenry is a tipping point
after which state failure may occur.
A number of terrorist organizations engage in goods provision activities.
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon regularly accomplishes such tasks. Flannigan (2008)
asserts that not only does Hezbollah hold numerous political positions within the
Lebanese government, but they also manage highly touted medical and social service
providers. Shortcomings of the government of Lebanon allow Hezbollah to gain support
of the masses by providing goods and services to citizens that they would otherwise not
receive. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood provides a number of services, such as
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healthcare, social services, and relief services to needy communities in the Palestinian
territory (Berman and Laitin 2008). Providing security to the citizens of the state is also
beneficial for terrorist organizations as it allows them to garner the trust and support of
those that they protect.
As states begin to lose control over their internal operations, terrorist
organizations are able to step forward and complete tasks that the state fails to complete.
In undermining the state’s authority through the provision of goods and services, terrorist
organizations can accomplish a multitude of objectives. Taking legitimacy away from
the standing state government allows them the chance to assert themselves as a legitimate
authority within the state. The state’s loss of legitimacy is dangerous and the state will
begin to experience some early warning signs of failure, and potentially suffer the
outbreak of civil war.
The role of state sponsorship is of concern when examining terrorist organizations
and their ability to provide such goods. A number of terrorist organizations worldwide
have some form of state sponsorship, whether it be financial or through other tangible
resources. However, this state sponsorship does not necessarily entail success in regards
to providing certain goods and services within the state. Terrorist organizations such as
the Glenanne Gang received some form of state sponsorship from the United Kingdom
and al Qaeda purportedly received aid from Saudi Arabia. Neither of these organizations
exhibit the capacity to act in a positive, state-building manner. This is not to say that
state sponsorship does not influence a terrorist organization’s ability to act in such a way,
but rather that it is not the most impactful factor. Further, these organizations are left to
invest the aid in whatever way they see fit.
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Hezbollah, for example, makes a conscious effort to use this aid to provide for the
citizens of the state as well as carry out terrorist tactics. Hezbollah’s use of Iranian
money is predicated on their opposition to Israel and Western ideals, and, as long as they
maintain that ideological adherence, Iran continues to give them money. To the contrary,
the purported support al Qaeda received was immediately put towards terrorist attacks
with little concern towards anything else. Garnering state sponsorship also serves as a
tactic for these terrorist organizations. Through collecting aid, the organization is free to
carry out their objective. Due to the indirect influence, the state sponsor is not
necessarily causing the terrorist organization to engage in positive activity. Such activity
is rather a result of the terrorist organization’s agenda, which is aided by revenue
collection.
Terrorist organizations engage in many activities that fill one, if not all, of the
gaps. Hezbollah’s provision of healthcare, social welfare, emergency relief, and their
claim to seats in the state government processes allow them to act towards the filling of
the capacity gap and legitimacy gap. They are providing these goods at a minimal level.
Conclusion
Terrorism is an act of violence carried out against innocent people with the intent
of coercing someone else into a political action they might not otherwise take. Through
the use of various tactics such as kidnapping, assassinations, and bombing, organizations
are able to engage in such activity. Any group that does so is a terrorist organization.
These organizations do commit criminal acts such as bank robbery and extortion, but that
does not make these actions terroristic in nature.
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Conditions surrounding poverty, governmental structure, and ethnic tensions have
an effect on the genesis of terrorism within a state. These factors are eerily similar to the
conditions that surround state failure. The presence of terrorist organizations within
failed states is confirmed by cross-examining the top 10 states on the Fragile States Index
and the GTD. In two of the three years examined over 50% of all domestic terrorist
attacks for each respective year occurred within these states.
Terrorist organizations are also capable of providing goods and services to the
citizens of a state. Through such provision they are able to challenge the legitimacy,
security, and capacity of the state. Such a challenge allows them the opportunity to
involve themselves with the citizens of the state and provides a way to become involved
with state politics. As terrorist organizations pursue their goals in such a manner it
becomes more likely they will achieve success.
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CHAPTER IV
CONSTRUCTING A CLASSIFICATION
In previous chapters state failure and terrorism were explored as precursors to the
development of the new classification offered by this study. Using the Call (2010) model
of state failure, a four-tiered classification structure is constructed. Based upon their
ability to fill the gaps, terrorist organizations are placed into one of the four tiers. By
examining their constructive abilities rather than their capability for destruction, this
classification provides a more intimate inspection of terrorist organizations that past
studies do not.
Existing classifications are predicated upon the organization’s adherence to an
ideology, area of operations, attack types, and the target audience. An understanding of
these aspects of terrorist organizations provides an image of the global situation
surrounding terrorism and provides necessary insight into the activity and motives of
these organizations. Problematically, these classifications are not effective at evaluating
terrorist organizations on an operational level that provides practical information
regarding their goals, their strengths, and their weaknesses. The classification offered
here provides this insight.
This chapter is devoted to clearly outlining what criteria terrorist organizations
must meet to fill each of the gaps, the basic structure of the classification system, and
how organizations are to be scored using the criteria set forth in discussion of filling the
gaps. The largest portion of the chapter is devoted to setting the criteria for filling the
gaps. Three major criteria are assigned to each gap and are broken down into sub
components. Using these criteria and the classification structure set forth, the next
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chapter provides case study analysis of terrorist organizations to show how the
classification process works.
Filling the Gaps
Each gap is assigned three major categories that are split up into subcategories to
establish the criteria that must be met in order to fill the gap. For the capacity gap,
resource control, goods and services provision, and infrastructural control are the major
categories. For the legitimacy gap, ethnic similarities, ideological congruence, and
political participation fulfill this role. Finally, for security, the categories are military
capabilities, policing capabilities, and territorial control within the state. Not all
categories are going to have subcategories, however. For those in which it is necessary,
the subcategories will be appropriately addressed.
Capacity
To fill the capacity gap, terrorist organizations must be able to control resources
within the state, provide goods and services to the citizens of the state, and control major
infrastructure. Resource control does not require subcategories, but goods and services
and infrastructure do. For goods and services, terrorist organizations are evaluated on
whether they can offer medical care, social welfare, and emergence relief. Infrastructure
control is split into control over transportation routes such as roads, railways, or
waterways, and control over utility providers such as power plants, hydroelectric dams,
or some other form of utilities.
The control over state resources allows for the collection of income and control
over the allocation of such resources. The resources referenced are natural resources
such as oil, precious metals and gems, water sources, and coal, for example. The list of
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resources is not limited just to these, however. Control over any resource gives an actor,
both state and non-state, considerable power within the state. Also, by controlling the
income that results from these resources, an actor is able to use the profits to provide
goods and services to the citizens of the state, bolster the economy, or use the money for
funding their own goals. Because it is outside the scope of this study to provide any
analysis on the ability of terrorist organizations to successfully fill these gaps over a long
period of time, the use of the income is not important. What is important is their having
control over resources within the state.
In Afghanistan, when the Taliban took over they secured control over the poppy
industry in the state. This gave them considerable control over the economy of the state
and the quality of life for the citizens within the state. As with many authoritarian
regimes, the Taliban were not so much concerned with the quality of life for their people,
but rather bolstering the state economy to serve in their favor. The influx of income
allowed them to maintain control over the internal workings of the state. In other states,
terrorist organizations have some control over oil fields, such as ISIS in Iraq. This brings
them considerable income that could be used for the good of the state. Whether this is
used for the good of the existing state or the state they wish to build is a different story
altogether.
Goods and services provision also goes towards filling the capacity gap within the
state. Citizens are often left wanting for basic goods and services within failed states.
Terrorist organizations that are able to provide such goods are able to work towards
closing the capacity gap within a state. As goods and services are administered, the lives
of the citizens improve and conditions become somewhat more bearable. Provision of
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such services as healthcare, social welfare, housing, and food distribution help fill the
capacity gap and bring about some stability for the state.
Goods and services must be separated out. While all are beneficial and provide
aid to the citizens of the state, they are not dependent on one another. Healthcare services
such as the provision of doctors and medical clinics is not necessarily tied to the
provision of food-stuffs to highly impoverished neighborhoods. This being the case,
terrorist organizations are evaluated on their ability to provide the following services
individually: healthcare, welfare, food, water, and emergency relief. It is highly probable
that terrorist organizations that offer goods and services are offering any mixture of these.
To be practical in analysis though, they are treated as being separate.
Hezbollah actively provides a number of highly touted services within Lebanon.
In many cases, citizens of the state, especially those belonging to the Shia population,
turn to Hezbollah for aid instead of the state. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood
provides such services as well as emergency relief to the citizens of the West Bank and
Gaza strip. In the absence of a strong government that provides these as expected, these
organizations have stepped up and taken the responsibility of providing for the state’s
citizens.
Infrastructural control provides further opportunity for terrorist organizations to
eliminate a capacity gap. Control over major transportation routes is key to controlling
the infrastructure of the state. In holding the roadways, railways, and waterways, a
terrorist organization is able to control trade and distribute resources throughout the state
with minimal interference. Provided the opportunity to regulate trade goods so that they
are funneled into producing income or used to aid the citizens of the state, terrorist
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organizations are able to bolster their ability to stabilize a capacity gap inflicted state and
restore stability. Waterways provide a unique opportunity, as these routes flow through
various states. The ability to tax the use of the waterway within the state provides
another source of income that can be used to provide to the stability of the state.
Control over major utility providers such as electric power plants and dams. Use
of these utilities can increase production within the state, make the lives of the citizens
more bearable, bolster the economy, and provide needed resources to aid in the
development of the state. The ability to allocate such utilities allows for further control
over the state and can influence the perception of the terrorist organization in the eyes of
the citizens of the state.
Through control of valuable natural resources, goods and services provision, and
control over state infrastructure, terrorist organizations can fill the capacity gap. As these
organizations stabilize the economy, regulate the infrastructure of the state, and make the
lives of the state’s citizens more bearable, they provide the opportunity to lift the state out
of the capacity gap and alleviate in state stress related to the lack of such control.
Legitimacy
Filling the legitimacy gap relies less on tangible issues than on sharing subjective
similarities with the citizens of the state. Filling the legitimacy gap is predicated on the
terrorist organization sharing ethnic similarities to the citizenry of the state, having a
worldview congruence, and actively participating in the political processes of the state.
While the capacity gaps are fairly universal for all states, the legitimacy gap and its
criteria are specific to each individual state. This process allows for illustration of
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situations in which the organization would both succeed and fail in an attempt to fill the
legitimacy gap.
Sharing an ethnic heritage with the citizens of a state is an effective way to
procure legitimacy from them. Habermas argues that “the ‘we-consciousness’, founded
on an imagined blood relation or on cultural identity of people who share a belief in a
common origin, identify one another as ‘members’ of the same community, and thereby
set themselves apart from the environment . . . constitute[s] the core of ethnic and
national social formations’ (Habermas 1998; 130). Being part of the “we” creates a
commonality with the citizens of the state that will not go unnoticed.
Through this commonality with the citizens, it is much easier to claim legitimacy.
In many cases, a citizen’s view of the authority and its legitimacy is based upon their
reflection of the citizen’s ethnic and cultural identity (Rothschild 1977). It is therefore
logical to assume that an organization that matches the ethnic identity of the people they
would govern will have a much better chance at securing their consent, and, in the
process, legitimacy. Furthermore, states historically have not taken well to outside
powers or forces entering their state and claiming authority.
It is reasonable to assume that the FARC would not be successful in an attempt to
gain legitimacy in Somalia. The cultural and linguistic differences alone are enough to
stymie any sort of attempt. It is likely that the group would be viewed as an outside
“imperial” power and the citizens of the state would reject their claim to authority.
However, in Colombia the FARC are much more likely to make a successful claim to
legitimacy. They share a similar ethnic and cultural heritage with the citizens of the state.
Similarly, Hamas in Palestine can and has made appeals to the ethnic similarities between

54
themselves and the people of the state to include themselves in the political processes of
the state. Although they defer control of the state to the Palestinian Authority (PA) they
could easily appeal to the people and earn their consent to be ruled and legitimacy.
Interestingly, the Middle East in particular makes it somewhat easier for an actor
from another state to make a successful claim for authority and legitimacy from the
people of another state. Many of these nations share similar ethnic backgrounds and
trace themselves back to a similar lineage. Therefore, an organization like Hezbollah
could make a claim for authority and legitimacy in a Sunni dominated Middle Eastern
state and meet less resistance than would the FARC or the LTTE.
Sharing a similar worldview as the citizens of the state, religious or secular,
allows a terrorist organization to further relate to the community within the state. This
worldview congruence provides a relationship to the citizens of a state that goes further
than just a similar ethnic heritage. The two are often tied to each other in some cultures,
but should be treated as separate and given acknowledgement if tied to one another.
Many feel as if one’s worldview is closely associated with just religious belief. It also
stems from a secular ideal that resonates throughout an entire community or state.
Research shows that ideologies are a primary, and central motivator for human (ReynalQuerol 2002). The same logic can be applied to strong secular belief such as Humanism
as well. Therefore, if a terrorist organization appeals to the ideals of the dominant
worldview in the state, they can establish themselves and a legitimate authority with less
of a challenge that someone from a different worldview attempting the same thing.
A worldview congruence serves another purpose as well. A terrorist organization
can advertise itself as holding a certain worldview as a means to coerce the citizens of a
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state to do as they wish. For instance, many Islamic extremist groups such as al Qaeda
and ISIL present themselves as purely religious Islamic organizations. In appealing to
the religious doctrine of the region in which they carry out their operations it is easier to
recruit and effectively implement their plans. This is not to say that these men are not
religious, but instead that they might be exaggerating their religious motives to appeal to
a wider audience.
Certainly, appealing to a worldview congruence (i.e. Christian or Islamic
doctrine) will merit consent from the people in many cases. However, a political
ideology such as the anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment gripping large portions of
the Middle East can easily motivate the citizens of a state to legitimate an authority who
also has such beliefs. For instance, the strong anti-Israeli sentiment held by Hamas
endears them to the people of Palestine who are victim of Israeli persecution and
repression. Other examples of such ideology would be adherence to Communist or
Democratic thought, or a hawkish or dovish stance in international affairs. Such a
political ideological congruence can influence the reception of a terrorist organization
within a state. By appealing to an ideological similarity, the same as a worldview
congruence, terrorist organizations are able to act as social chameleons and build a sense
of community with the citizens of the state.
Political participation allows a terrorist organization to establish a foothold in the
legitimate political processes of the state and strengthen their claim to authority and the
legitimacy that comes with it. Acosta (2014) argues that terrorist organizations that
involve themselves with the political processes of the state are much more likely to
achieve their goals via legitimate routes instead of ineffective clandestine operations that
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have to target the citizens of the state. As they earn a legitimate voice, their attempts at
change gain more legitimacy and, through this, the terrorist organization becomes a more
legitimate operator.
It is feasible that domestic, and some transnational terrorist organizations are
involved with the political landscape of their home nation or others. Often times they
resort to terrorist tactics when they do not have a strong political voice and need to
forward their political agenda. For instance, Hezbollah currently holds a number of seats
in the Lebanese Parliament and have two members in the cabinet. They are arguably one
of the most effective political organizations in Lebanon, as the people are very likely to
come to them for aid instead of the state government (Wiegand 2009). Engaging in such
activity allows the terrorist organization a voice in the political processes, and to gain
legitimacy that would allow for an eventual move to become the sovereign authority of
the state.
Holding an ethnic similarity to the people of a state, a similar worldview, and
involving themselves in the political processes of the state allows a terrorist organization
to work towards filling a legitimacy gap. By themselves becoming legitimate and
asserting their power as a sovereign authority, the organization removes the state from a
legitimacy gap and stabilizes the state. Such a stabilization can be tenuous, however, and
must constantly be maintained.
Security
A security gap is difficult to fill. It requires that an actor maintain a military force
capable of fighting off outside threats, controlling territory within the state, and having
the capability to police the territory that it holds to ward of internal threats. Very few
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non-state actors are able to provide such a credible offer of security. Even so, terrorist
organizations are still evaluated on their ability to close a security gap. Territorial control
is split into the control of territory itself and the control over major cities within the state.
The other two criteria are self-standing and need no further separation.
To begin, a terrorist organization must be able to field a sizable military force.
Provided military capabilities, terrorist organizations can engage enemies and maintain
internal order and security. Also, through the use of such power, they can maintain a
firm hold on territories and cities that they have claimed through conquest. This type of
presence serves as a deterrent to outside invaders as well as internal groups who might
attempt a coup.
They must be capable of deterring outside threats as well as securing the borders
of the state. This entails access to weaponry, personnel, and supplies. This is possible,
but terrorist organizations may have to look to outside actors for help. For instance, the
Taliban were able to field such a military force in Afghanistan. However, this was only
possible due to weapons and training that were provided by the Pakistani government.
Through this military superiority, the Taliban were able to completely control
Afghanistan until the most powerful military in the world invaded. Hezbollah was
similar in their initial and continued reliance on Iran for finances and military training.
ISIL currently holds a military force that is engaging with outside actors, but is
not weathering well. For a time, until states surrounding Iraq and Syria became involved
in the fight against ISIL, the organization was effectively capturing cities and territory
and defeating all military threats to them. However, if examining ISIL for their military
capabilities alone, and not their combat record against the states with whom they are
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currently engaged, it is possible to recognize them as being able to fill a security gap.
They are also recruiting at an alarming rate as young adults from highly developed states
are attempting to leave their homes to join ISIL. As to the success ISIL would enjoy after
filling a security gap, there is no clear answer, but, as of their current engagements, there
would be no long term hold.
Territorial control also serves to close a security gap. As terrorist organizations
gain control over large swaths of territory within a state, they become responsible for its
protection and security. They must defend it against attempts by other actors to claim
territory, repel outside invaders, and crush any internal strife that may arise. In failed
states, this type of territorial control allows the terrorist organization the ability to fill the
security gap within a state.
Seizing cities and villages throughout the state strengthens a terrorist
organizations hold over territory. It is one thing to control the land surrounding a city,
but control over the city itself is an accomplishment that solidifies control over the
territory surrounding it. The seizure of urban centers within the state allows the terrorist
organization to drive out political and military opponents, and serves to weaken these
opponents by not allowing them access to resources and the population that they need in
order to continue fighting. While the regime put in place by the terrorist organizations
may not be fair, open, and democratic, the citizens are provided some level of security
from outside threats.
The Taliban completed such tasks from 1996 until 2001 when the United States
invaded and ousted them as rulers of the state. By 1996, the Taliban had expanded their
territorial control from just the Kandahar province in the southern region of the state to a
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vast majority of the state’s total territory. During this expansion, they effectively drove
away warlords who had claimed power and, assumed control of the state government. It
was not until a far superior United States military invaded that the Taliban lost control
over all this territory. As far as threats in the region were concerned though, the Taliban
were more than capable of providing security against them.
Ability to police territory once taken is extremely important. While the military
can serve as a deterrent from internal uprising, it is not their job to deter crime and
lawlessness. The ability to police internally provides extra security to the citizens of the
state and further allows the terrorist organization to work towards filling the security gap.
Problematically, with a number of modern terrorist organizations, this self-policing
results in harsh treatment of offenders under somewhat archaic laws that apply merciless
punishment for rather menial crimes.
During their time of dominance in Afghanistan, the Taliban ruthlessly policed the
people. Anyone found committing a crime was swiftly and harshly dealt with, without
opportunity to plead innocence. The Taliban also implemented harsh Sharia Law within
the state that went as far as commanding the type of clothing women could wear. This
required that they be covered from head to toe with no skin showing. Women who did
not meet these criteria were harshly punished, with some even being put to death. ISIL
currently exhibits a similar capability for policing, however they themselves are the threat
to the people. Their policing is so cruel that, even if the citizens are protected from
outside threats, they face a similar or even worse threat from ISIL. Just as with military
capabilities, the simple ability to police is taken into consideration, not the record the
organization holds currently.
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Each of the gaps has been prescribed a set of criteria to be met in order to fill
them. Using these, terrorist organizations are evaluated, classified, and placed in the
appropriate classification tier. It might be assumed that terrorist organizations
completing these goals is itself the cause of state failure. While it is true that terrorist
organizations and other separatist groups can cause instability, this study assumes that
these terrorist organizations would be operating in states that are already failed, therefore
their completion of such activities would not contribute to the failure of the state. This
does point out, however, that terrorist organizations are grave threats to state stability in a
number of cases and must be dealt with swiftly. Using this classification system will
allow policy makers to identify these groups and attack to stop them from accomplishing
such goals.
Constructing the Classification System
Each terrorist organization is classified based upon its ability to meet the criteria
to fill any of the three gaps. The criteria, as discussed above are scored as one point each
and a terrorist organization must score two points to be considered able to fill the gap.
From here, each organization is placed in the four-tiered structure to separate and classify
them. This section fully examines the structure of the classification, scoring system, and
provides insight into the classification process.
The structure of the classification is a four-tiered structure reliant on the number
of a gaps a terrorist organization is able to fill. Organizations that are unable to fill any of
the gaps are placed in the bottom-most tier, Tier 1. Those that are able to fill at least one
of the gaps, regardless of which, are placed into Tier 2. Tier 3 holds those organizations
that are able to fill two of the gaps. Finally, Tier 4 holds those that are able to fill all
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three of the gaps. For Tiers 2 and 3, terrorist organizations are labeled to represent which
of the gaps they are able to feel. For capacity the label is a C, for legitimacy L, and for
security S.
The criteria in each gap offer a possible total score of three points (Table 1). A
terrorist organization must score at least two points to be considered able to fill the gap.
For the capacity gap, a half point is awarded for controlling any major state resource, a
point and a half is split between the three services listed so each is worth one-third of a
point, and half a point is awarded for controlling the major transportation routes of the
state and a half point for controlling a utilities provider for a total of three points. For
legitimacy, a point is awarded for ethnic similarities and political participation while both
the worldview and political ideological congruence are worth .5 points. For security, one
point is awarded for military capability, one half point for controlling a portion of the
state’s territory, one half point for controlling a major city, and one point for having the
capability to police the state. Any combination of points that amount to two points in the
gap suggests the terrorist organization can fill it.
Table 1
Scoring Within the Gaps
Capacity – 3 points

Legitimacy – 3 points

Security – 3 points

Resource control – .5

Ethnic Similarities – 1

Military Capability – 1

Goods and Services

Worldview Congruence – .5 Territorial Control

•

Health – .5

Political Ideological

•

Land Control – .5

•

Welfare

Congruence – .5

•

Major City – .5
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Table 1 (continued)
•

Emer. Relief – .5

Political Participation – 1

Infrastructural Control
•

•

Policing
Capability – 1

Transportation
Routes – .5

Utilities Providers – .5

Conclusion
The new classification of terrorist organizations presented by this thesis is
presented. Using Call’s model of state failure, a set of criteria are developed. To fill a
capacity gap, a terrorist organization needs to control resources, provide services, and
hold key infrastructure in the state. The legitimacy gap is filled by sharing an ethnic
heritage, a worldview congruence, and actively participating in the states political
processes. The security gap can be closed by having an established military, controlling
territory within the state, and having the ability to police within the state.
Using these, a scoring system is put into place that terrorist organizations can be
evaluated by to ascertain whether or not they can fill a particular gap. By scoring at least
two points for a gap, a terrorist organization is considered able to fill the gap. Based on
the number of gaps they can fill, they are placed in the appropriate tier. Using this
classification system allows researchers and policy makers alike to glean a new
understanding of terrorist organizations and begin developing solutions to the problems
they and state failure may cause.

63
CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY
To show the operation of the classification system, three terrorist organizations
are used as case study. The FARC, Hezbollah, and the LTTE are examined in depth to
ascertain their classification and ability to fill each of the gaps. For each, a brief history
of the organization and their activities within their state is explored. Based upon this,
they are scored according to the criteria set forth in the previous chapter and then placed
in the appropriate tier. The conclusion of the chapter also addresses some of the findings
related to this classification and their impact on the study of terrorism.
Due to a lack of data regarding terrorist organizations, this study is limited to a
small number of cases. The terrorist organizations evaluated do not reside within failed
states but the case studies take their activities within their current state into account, and
assumes they would act in a similar fashion within a failed state. Through using these
cases as examples to express the usefulness of the classification attention is drawn to the
necessity for further data collection. While these cases are merely a theoretical
examination, they efficiently and effectively demonstrate the appropriateness of the
classification presented.
FARC
The FARC were formed in the 1960s as a Marxist/Communist paramilitary
organization in Colombia. Their creation was driven by the loss of land by hundreds of
thousands of Colombians due to the decision of Colombian elites to move towards an
agrarian society whose primary source of income would be large, industrialized farms
and ranches (Domina and Berecz 2014). From their creation to the present day, the
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organization uses terrorist tactics to combat the Colombian government and civilians that
support the state.
The organization has fielded membership of up to ten thousand. Recent years
have seen a decline in membership as the Colombian military has removed or killed a
number of high ranking leaders and officials with the group. The organization is
primarily funded through practices of extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, and
narcotics trade (Renwick and Hanson 2013; Domina and Berecz 2014). They are
responsible for a large percentage of the state’s cocaine trade and rake in millions, if not
billions in income annually.
At times, the FARC have controlled upwards of one-third of the state’s territory.
However, as Colombia is home to dense jungle that makes up a large portion of the
state’s territory, this is not an impressive feat. Control of the territory does offer the
organization a safe and nearly impossible-to-navigate maze of hideouts and staging areas.
This land allows them to coordinate guerrilla warfare against the state but they are unable
to match the state sponsored military in manpower and weaponry.
Outside of control over heavily vegetated jungle territory, the FARC holds no
territory that inhibits the state’s function or that would allow them to be influential in
state politics. Outside of scattered villages, there are no major cities or major transport
routes in the territory. Those villages are of no threat to the FARC and are kept in line
through threats and fear. State military and police forces are able to access these villages,
but are unlikely to get information from anyone due to the fear of reprisal.
There is no evidence to support the idea that the FARC offers any kind of goods
and services to those in the state either. The organization is much more worried with
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progressing the Marxist/Communist ideology and bringing about the collapse of the
Colombian government than they are with the well being and benefit of the citizens of the
state. The ideology that drives the organization’s activities also serves to separate them
from the citizenry of the state because democracy and capitalism are perceived as
preferable and acceptable than the antiquated and failed Soviet ideology that resonated
throughout the Cold War. They do, however, share an ethnic heritage with the citizens of
the state.
The FARC are not able to fill any of the gaps and are therefore classified as a Tier
1 terrorist organization (Table 2). They score 0 points in the capacity gap due to their
lack of control over state resource, provision of goods and services, and infrastructural
control. They score 1 point in the legitimacy gap for matching the ethnic heritage of the
citizens of the state. Finally, they score .5 points in the security gap for controlling
territory, which may be a generous allocation of a score seeing that the territory
controlled is mostly meaningless as far as state functions go.
Table 2
Scoring the FARC
Capacity – 0

Legitimacy – 1

Security – .5

The organization is unable

Ethnic similarities – 1

Territorial Control

to accomplish any of the
prescribed criteria

•

Territory – .5
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Hezbollah
Hezbollah came to existence during the Lebanese civil war that took place from
1975-1990, and was the result of Israeli invasion and occupation, and were formed as a
militia group with the aid of Iran (Anderson and Sloan 1995). Lebanon had served as a
base of operations for Palestinian terrorist organizations such as the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel invaded in an attempt to flush out these
organizations and destroy them. Hezbollah rose as a voice to stand against the presence
of Western and Israeli influence in Lebanese affairs, and, more broadly, in the Middle
East. They did not call for an independent Lebanese state but instead desired to
incorporate Lebanon into a larger, more encompassing Islamic State that would envelope
the entire region (Hamzeh 1993). This ideology has shifted in recent years to simply
securing an independent and sovereign Lebanese state.
The organization was able to garner support from the newly installed Iranian
government that resulted from the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. Iranian leadership
saw the organization and its young revolutionary leadership as a possible outlet for
spreading the idea of Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East (Norton 2014). The
Iranian government supplied a hefty amount of money and military training to the
members of the organization. Iran’s support for the organization continues to this day
with nearly $200 million in financial support annually (Masters and Laub 2014). The
organization also draws financial support from a number of local sponsors, as well as
securing income through criminal activities such as smuggling and narcotics trade.
Since its creation in the mid-1980s, the organization has garnered considerable
political clout and is actively involved in the political processes of the state. Currently,
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they hold ten seats in the Lebanese Parliament and have two party members serving in
the Cabinet. The organization’s Shia base allows them to potentially hold a high and
influential position in the state government as the Speaker of Parliament is required to be
Shia. The Shia based population of the state find a strong voice with Hezbollah and
provide massive amounts of support for the organization. In return, Hezbollah’s
organizational structure and purpose are geared towards the care of the Shia population as
well as building a stable Lebanese state that is free of outside influence, namely influence
of the Western world.
The Worldwide Terrorist List 2014 produced by the Athena Institute, describes
Hezbollah as an organization that “run[s] charities, hospitals, schools and implements
effective polices in territories they control to combat poverty and other social issues”
(Domina and Berecz 2014, 30). This in particular has led to the successes Hezbollah has
enjoyed in political elections. The organization has a number of committees devoted to
services provision such as the committees for: power, water, health, financial aid, and the
environment (Hamzeh 1993). As pointed out by Flannigan (2008), they maintain and
control very highly touted service providers within the state, which helps to alleviate the
shortcomings of the state to provide such goods. Also, they provide emergency relief and
aid to those who need it within their territories. The goods and services provision
constitutes a large portion of the objectives of the organization. Their control over power
and water resources gives them considerable influence over the infrastructure of the state
as well.
Hezbollah maintains an active military and security division as well. As of 2014,
they organized and maintain what is one of the largest non-state militaries in the world.
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Their military consists of thousands of members who serve on a full-time or voluntary
basis (Domina and Berecz 2014). Through this they are able to maintain control of the
territories in which they rule and actively engage in regular combat with Israel and other
actors they see to be credible threats to the security of Lebanon and its people. Further,
their military capabilities are such that they can devote troops to fight for the Assad
regime in Syria, although this is showing signs of being detrimental to their cause.
Numerous agreements exist to demilitarize and disarm militant groups in
Lebanon, but Hezbollah has managed to avoid such action. U.N. Resolution 1559
ordered the disbanding and disarmament of all militant groups within the state, both
Lebanese and non-Lebanese, yet Hezbollah has remained armed by calling themselves a
resistance group instead of a militant group. This provides immediate security concerns
for Israel and concerns for regional stability by other world powers. In Lebanon, the
Hezbollah support for the Assad regime has led to Sunni led reprisal attacks that have
cost the lives of some Shia civilians. By refusing to disarm and disband their military
forces, the organization maintains a sizable and formidable military presence that worries
policy makers and state leaders alike.
The organization also shares a similar ethnic heritage with those of the state.
While the Sunni and the Shia populations adhere to slightly different religious ideology,
they share an ethnic heritage. Importantly though are the similarities between the Shia
population and Hezbollah. This allows Hezbollah to identify themselves with a portion
of the population which results in their election and rise to power. Through its military
campaigns against Israel, Hezbollah is able to bring itself closer to the Sunni population
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despite their philosophical difference. The organization therefore shares a worldview and
political ideological congruence with the citizens of the state.
Using this information, Hezbollah is scored and classified as a Tier 4 terrorist
organization, able to fill all three gaps (Table 3). For the capacity gap, they receive a
score of 2 for their provision of health, welfare, emergency aid and relief, and control
over utilities provision within the state. For legitimacy, they receive 3 points because
they meet all criteria for filling the gap. Because of their military capability, land control,
and policing capabilities within the state, they receive a score of 2.5 for the security gap.
Hezbollah is therefore able to fill all three gaps.
Table 3
Scoring Hezbollah
Capacity – 2 points

Legitimacy – 3 points

Security – 2.5 points

Goods and Services

Ethnic Similarities – 1

Military Capability – 1

•

Health – .5

Worldview Congruence – .5 Territorial Control

•

Welfare – .5

Political Ideological

•

Emer. Relief – .5

Congruence – .5

Infrastructural Control
•

Political Participation – 1

•

Territorial Control –
.5

Policing Capability – 1

Utilities - .5

LTTE
The LTTE operate on the island nation of Sri Lanka. The organization formed in
the early 1970s and began carrying out terrorist attacks in the mid-1970s. Primarily, the
organization acted in the desire to create a separate and independent state for the minority
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Tamils within Sri Lanka (Flanigan 2008). Their attacks targeted the Sri Lankan people
and Tamils that were not supportive of a separate Tamil state. For a number of years they
were engaged in outright civil war with the Sinhalese government. They carried out
numerous attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on not only the Sinhalese military, but also
the people of the state and the Indian army when they were deployed to help ensure peace
in the mid-1980s.
The organization continued armed engagement with the Sinhalese state until they
were defeated in a decisive manner in 2009. During this time, they fielded a military
capacity between 10,000 to 15,000 members strong as well as police forces to maintain
order in the territory they controlled in the northern and the eastern portions of the state.
The LTTE commands special interest in regards to their military capabilities as they are
the only terrorist organization to command a three branched military outfit. They were
the only terrorist in the world to have operational army, navy, and air force (Domina and
Berecz 2014). It wasn’t until their defeat that they lost control of these territories and the
Sinhalese government took over control. For the purposes of this study, the organization
is assessed before their defeat in 2009 to ascertain how they should be classified to
further demonstrate the operationalization of the classification system.
The LTTE openly engaged in combat with the Sri Lankan government on
numerous occasions as well as engaging the Indian army. They were successful in many
of these engagements and were able to forcibly maintain their control over their held
territory. They were able to elicit support and troops for their military forces for these
conflicts through coercion and by championing the Tamil minority. It was dangerous to
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be a Tamil that was not supportive of the LTTE and its mission as that drastically
increased the chances that a terrorist attack would be targeted at those who were not.
The LTTE served as the de facto government of the northern and eastern sectors
of the state for well over two decades. They established the leadership of the state,
maintained a government structure with officials, and worked on behalf of the Tamil
people. Through this governmental setup, the LTTE provided a police force, court
systems, and other wings to perform various administrative functions (Flanigan 2008).
They were not able to function as a state would in the international community due to a
lack of international recognition, but they were able to maintain control over the regions
they held.
Goods and services provision is handled through various NGOs and the LTTE
departments of health and education (Stokke 2006). The organization provides some
services to the populous but the majority is done through regional and international
NGOs. Through these NGOs services like medical care, welfare, and community
building are offered. Some of the NGOs are related to the LTTE but there is not enough
evidence to support the claim that the LTTE provided the goods and services. The
organization did work to secure the aid of the NGOs, however, but this speaks more to
the legitimacy and influence of the organization rather than their ability to provide goods
and services.
The organization held control over the utilities services in the territory of the state
that they controlled. They also controlled and monitored the major transportation routes
through the portion of the state they resided in. This allowed for the control over trade
and influence over the productivity of the territory. This further allowed the LTTE to
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combat the state without interference when operating in their own territory because they
had the freedom of mobility and the means for mass production.
The LTTE share a similar ethnic heritage with the minority Tamils of the state,
but share little to none with the Sinhalese population. However, these ties are much
stronger with the minority Tamils. Because the organization’s primary objective is to
establish an independent and sovereign Tamil state it is safe to assume that they more
closely associate themselves as Tamils. This similarity provides great amounts of
support among the Tamil community but serves to alienate them from the Sinhalese
population. Unlike Hezbollah, they do not engage in activities that endear them to a
majority of the state’s population even though they belong to a separated or dissimilar
ethnic heritage. The organization also prescribes to the Hindu religion, which is different
than nearly 80% of the state’s population, which are Buddhist. Their objective of the
independent Tamil state excludes them from sharing a political ideological congruence
with the state because of it not being a widespread political desire within the state.
The LTTE is classified as a Tier 2 organization able to fill only one gap (Table 4).
The organization is awarded 1 point for the capacity gap due to their control over utilities
providers and major transportation routes however they do not meet the 2 point threshold
needed to earn consideration as able to fill the gap. They are unable to fill the legitimacy
gap as they are unable to complete any of the prescribed criteria meriting a score of 0 for
the gap. Because of their overwhelming military forces that includes an army, navy, and
air force, their control over territory and major cities, and their ability to police the
territory they hold, they are awarded 3 points for the security gap signaling their ability to
fill it. They are therefore a Tier 2 S terrorist organization.
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Table 4
Scoring the LTTE
Capacity – 1

Legitimacy – 0

Security – 3

Infrastructural Control

The organization is unable

Military Capability – 1

Transportation

to accomplish any of the

Territorial Control

Routes – .5

prescribed criteria

•

•

•

Control of Territory
– .5

Utilities – .5
•

Control of major
city – .5

Policing capabilities – 1

Conclusion
This chapter shows the ability, or lack thereof, of terrorist organizations to fill the
gaps. Importantly, this confirms the main hypothesis of the study that terrorist
organizations are able to engage in activities that can stabilize failed states. By filling
these gaps they are providing the foundation to reestablish the state and the
underpinnings of government, providing the security needed to protect the state, or are
providing the care that citizens need to exist. The difficult question that must be asked
now is whether these organizations need to be disbanded, destroyed, or contained.
The distinction between those terrorist organizations that act benevolently and
those that act malevolently, must be taken into consideration. A group like Hezbollah,
even if engaging in terrorist activity outside of the state, poses to do more good for the
citizens of the state and the overall stability of its political structures than does ISIL.
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Therefore this classification presents researchers and policy makers with a decision.
Should some of these groups be allowed to operate, under containment and with some
oversight, or should we continue to develop blanket policy to combat terrorism on a
global scale without taking into consideration that these organizations might be doing
more to help the state in which they operate more than any NGO or another state may?
Sadly, it is not within the scope or intentions of this study to answer this question now,
but it must be taken into consideration and is suggested for future study.
The FARC, Hezbollah, and LTTE are offered as case study and example
classifications to accomplish a number of goals. First, this shows how the scoring system
for the classification works and the placement of terrorist organizations into the tiered
structure works. This also establishes that terrorist organizations can and do operate in
constructively. The reason for this constructive activity is outside of the scope of this
study, however. Importantly, these case studies exemplify the usefulness of the
classification system and provide the framework for future research and data collection.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the linkages between failed states and
terrorist organizations. In particular, the ability of terrorist organizations to stabilize
failed states is evaluated. Results show that there are some terrorist organizations that are
indeed capable of stabilizing these states. However, no indication is given as to whether
these results are fleeting or long-term. Importantly though, this provides an intimate look
into the positive capabilities of terrorist organizations outside of their destructive
capabilities showing that they are capable of positive activity that is beneficial to the
citizens of a state. Terrorist organizations are examined due to their use of violence to
meet political goals unlike NGOs who are limited due to constraints placed on them by
the host state and the international community.
State failure stems from a number of issues. Economic struggles, political
corruption, and ethnic tensions are but just a few within a long list of other causes. These
are particularly important, however, because they are eerily similar to the factors that
influence the genesis of terrorism within a state. The alarming number of domestic
terrorist attacks within these states alone merits the academic inquiry offered due to the
high number of domestic terrorist attacks that occur within states in the top 10 of the
Fragile States Index. As a number of international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and states have attempted to stabilize and “fix the failed”, new approaches
must be taken. It is for this reason that this thesis evaluates the capabilities of terrorist
organizations to engage in such activity.
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The role of these terrorist organizations in these states sometimes runs much
deeper than their attacks, however. Organizations like Hezbollah operate in struggling
states and provide an impressive number of social services, governmental legitimacy, and
security to the people of the state all the while resorting to terrorist tactics to achieve a
number of their goals. This underlies the idea that there is always political motive behind
terrorist attacks. In many instances, Hezbollah uses terrorism as a way to ward off threats
to the security of Lebanon as well as protecting the state’s citizens from outside invaders.
Terrorist organizations take many forms throughout the world. It is neither the
objective nor intent of this study to debate the intrinsic good or evil nature of such
organizations. That said, there is a distinct benevolent/malevolent nature to the activities
of terrorist organizations. While some terrorist organizations act in order to be the voice
for a minority, or are attempting to rectify social injustices within a state, others are much
more nefarious. For example, the goal of ISIL is not to be the advocate for an
underprivileged population and champion their cause, they use terror because they wish
to destroy all they disagree with and replace it with a new, even more repressive and
intolerant regime than those that stand. These organizations may meet the criteria to fill
any of the gaps, but by no means are able to stabilize a failed state because they wish to
destroy the state they are in.
The classification presented provides significant insight into the positive
capabilities of terrorist organizations. Through evaluation of the abilities to meet a
number of criteria, terrorist organizations are judged on abilities that are believed to
influence a positive outcome of state building. The four-tiered structure provides a
classification structure that allows for the separation of terrorist organizations so that
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those that are more capable are set apart from those that are not capable. Provided this
information, academics and policy makers alike can synthesize new information about
these terrorist organizations that can aid in the development of competent and sound
policy. Through an understanding of what strengths these groups outside of their ability
to commit terrorist acts, a new dimension of these organizations rarely explored is
exposed.
As policy makers begin taking these positive abilities into account, a more direct
and effective policy to combat these organizations can be developed. Since the start of
the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, the nearly universal policy to deal with terrorist
organizations is to combat them physically in an attempt to eradicate them. This thesis
provides insight how to instead build policy directed at eliminating the social conditions
that allow terrorist organizations to gain popularity and support among the citizens of a
state. By addressing these pressing issues and understanding what allows these
organizations to garner support in states, policymakers can stymie the growth of terrorist
organizations and in the meanwhile, bolster the failing states of the world.
The scoring criteria were the recipients of much thought and consideration. Each
have some tie to the expected responsibilities of a state. Failed states are unable to
complete such tasks or simply forgo them even if they have the ability in many cases.
This allows non-state actors such as terrorist organizations to step up and provide leading
to a growth in their influence and power. By dividing terrorist organizations into the
tiered structure, their role within not only the failed state, but in other states is
distinguished and is set forth for further evaluation by future studies.
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The three case studies provided exemplify the various constructive traits a
terrorist organization can possess. From the capability to provide citizens of the state
with goods and services to the ability to field a sizable military force, these organizations
are capable of a wide array of activities. The same scoring technique and etiquette can be
applied to any terrorist organization throughout the world. The results will obviously
vary, but even for those that are unable to fill any of the gaps insight is offered into what
they are capable of. Through an understanding these positive capabilities, policy makers
can make relevant and tailored policy decisions designed to stymie the growth of these
organizations and eradicate the need for their resort to terrorist activity.
The constructive abilities of these organizations is incredible. The ability of
Hezbollah to fill all three gaps is astounding because many are so quick to assume that a
terrorist organization cannot possible be capable of positive activity. Terrorist
organizations are much more complex than we would like to believe. They are
sometimes state builders in disguise, and there is often more to them than meets the eye.
A growing number of studies touch on this, but the effort must be increased. Results of
these studies may not only tell us more about the positive influence these organizations
have, but also give more insight as to why they choose the tactics they do.
This thesis was limited to three case studies due to a lack of information regarding
many terrorist organizations. The lack of data results from the perceived irrelevance of
an organization or simply the inability to gather such data presently. Further, even
though state failure still undergoes academic inquiry, there are any combination of issues
that may instigate the onset of a failure situation that researchers have yet to understand.
The classification system presented is based off of current knowledge regarding failure
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and should and will be updated as the knowledge surrounding the topic continues to
grow.
Provided more detailed information on any number of the world’s terrorist
organizations, there is expectation that this study shall be expanded in the future. With
the information presented, the positive relationship a terrorist organization potentially can
have with a state is shown and begs for further study. This thesis highlights the glaring
lack of knowledge regarding this relationship and provides the guidance to close the gap.
State failure and terrorism are pressing matters that are interrelated. This thesis
provides insight into this relationship as well as paves the way for further research. As
we learn more about both of these phenomena, their causes, and their relationships,
security of the state, the region, and the international community can be bolstered for the
good of all.

80
APPENDIX A
PERMISSIONS TO USE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
3/14/2015 The University of Southern Mississippi Mail - Request for Permission to use
Intellectual property

Joshua Freeman <joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu>

Request for Permission to use Intellectual
property
3 messages
Joshua Freeman <joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu>
joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu> Wed, Jan 21,
2015 at 2:10 PM To: jgoldsto@gmu.edu
Dr. Goldstone,
I am Joshua Freeman and I am currently a graduate student at The
University of Southern Mississippi studying political science. I am currently
writing my Master's
ster's thesis regarding the ability of terrorist organizations to
serve as a stabilizing entity in failed states. In your 2005 APSA Conference
paper, "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability" there is a figure,
Figure 1 "Incidence and Prevalenc
Prevalence
e of Political Instability Worldwide, 19552003" that I would like to use in my thesis as it would be very useful to do
my literature review on state failure as well as help illustrate the gravity of
the situation surrounding these states. I contact you tto
o ask for the
permissions to use your figure in my project. Thank you for taking the time
to read this email.

Best regards, Joshua A. Freeman
Jack A. Goldstone <jgoldsto@gmu.edu> To: Joshua Freeman
<joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu>

81

Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 2:28 PM

Dear Joshua, You have my permission to use the specified figure,
provided you give proper citation of the paper as source.
Jack A. Goldstone
Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Scholar Virginia E. and John T.
Hazel, Jr. Professor of Public Policy School of Policy, Government
and International Affairs
George Mason University 3351 Fairfax Drive, 5th Floor, MS 3B1
Arlington, VA 22201 USA 1-703-993-1409
http://jackgoldstone.gmu.edu/
Director, Research Laboratory on Political Demography and Social
Macrodynamics Russian Academy of National Economy and Public
Administration 82 Vernadskogo Prospekt, Moscow, Russian
Federation 119571 +7 (967) 260 8211
Get my latest books from Oxford University Press ‐‐
REVOLUTIONS: A Very Short Introduction
http://www.amazon.com/Revolutions-Very-Short-Introduction
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=6b23e8359c&view=pt&q=jgoldsto%40gmu.edu&qs
=true&search=query&th=14b
=true&search=query&th=14b0e1e55887b590&siml=14b0e1e55887b... 1/2
3/14/2015 The University of Southern Mississippi Mail - Request for Permission to use
Intellectual property

Introductions/dp/0199858500/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8
&qid=1377719512&sr=1-5
and POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY: Ho
How
w Population Changes are
Reshaping International Security and National Politics

82

http://www.amazon.com/Political-Demography-Population-R
eshaping-International/dp/0199945969/
ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377719512&sr=1-4
ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377719512&sr=1-4#
Visit my blog on the global econ
economy
omy and world politics at
http://newpopulationbomb.com
From: Joshua Freeman
[mailto:joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu
joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu] Sent: Wednesday,
January 21, 2015 3:11 PM To: Jack A. Goldstone Subject:
Request for Permission to use Intellectual property
[Quoted text hidden]

Joshua Freeman <joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu> To: "Jack A.
Goldstone" <jgoldsto@gmu.edu>
Dr. Goldstone,
Thank you very much, and proper citation will be given.
Joshua Freeman [Quoted text hidden]
Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 2:30 PM

83
REFERENCES
Abadie, Alberto. 2006. "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism". The
American Economic Review 96 (2): 50-56.
Abrahms, Max. 2008. "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and
Counterterrorism Strategy". International Security 32 (4): 78-105.
Acosta, Benjamin. 2014. "From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations
Transition to Political Parties". The Journal of Politics 76 (3): 666-683.
Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1995. "Fiscal Expansions and Fiscal Adjustments
in OECD Countries". Imf 44 (2): 210-248.
Anderson, Sean, and Stephen Sloan. 1995. Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. Historical
dictionaries of religions, philosophies, and movements., ed. Jon Woronoff.
Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
Asal, Victor, and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2008. "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational
Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks". The Journal of Politics 70 (2):
437-449.
Athena Institute. 2014. Worldwide Terror List 2014, eds. Kristof Domina, Tamas Berecz.
Budapest, Hungary: Center for Preventative Action Foundation.
Barkin, Samuel J., and Bruce Cronin. 1994. "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms
and the Rules of International Relations". International Organization 48 (1): 107130.
Bates, Robert H. 2008. "State Failure". The Annual Review of Political Science 11 : 1-12.
Berman, Eli, and Laurence R. Iannaccone. 2006. “Religious Extremism: The Good, the
Bad, and the Deadly”. Public Choice 128 : 109-129.

84
Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin. 2008. "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing
the Club Model". Journal of Public Economics 92 : 1942-1967.
Black, Donald. 2004. "The Geometry of Terrorism". Sociological Theory 22 (1): 14-25.
Boas, Morten, and Kathleen Jennings. 2007. "'Failed States' and 'State Failure': Threats or
Opportunities?". Globalizations 4 (4): 475-485.
Brockhoff, Sarah, Tim Krieger, and Daniel Meierrieks. 2014. "Great Expectations and
Hard Times - the (non-trivial) Impact of Education on Terrorism". Journal of
Conflict Resolution. Published online March 2014.
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/03/05/0022002713520589.full
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism and Patterns of
Terrorist Violence". International Organization 17 (4): 145-176.
Burgoon, Brian. 2006. "On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Politicaleconomic Roots of Terrorism". Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2): 176-203.
Call, Charles T. 2010. "Beyond the 'Failed State': Toward Conceptual Alternatives".
European Journal of International Relations 17 (2): 303-326.
———. 2008. "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'". Third World Quarterly 29 (8): 14911507.
Chenoweth, Erica. 2013. "Terrorism and Democracy". Annual Review of Political
Science 16 : 355-378.
Choi, Seung-Whan. 2010. "Fighting Terrorism Through the Rule of Law?". Journal of
Conflict Resoultion 54 (6): 940-966.
Chowdhury, Arjun, and Raymond Duvall. 2014. "Sovereignty and Sovereign Power".
International Theory 6 (2): 191-223.

85
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War". Oxford
Economic Papers 56 : 563-595.
Crenshaw, Martha. 1983. "The Causes of Terrorism". Comparative Politics 13 (4): 379399.
Cruz-Coke, Marta Lagos. 2001. "Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America". Journal
of Democracy 12 (1): 137-145.
Enders, Walter, Todd Sandler, and Khrusav Gaibulloev. 2011. "Domestic Versus
Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics". Journal of
Peace Research 48 (3): 319-337.
Englehart, Niel A. 2009. "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights". Journal of
Peace Research 46 (2): 163-180.
Fearon, James D. 2005. "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War". Journal of
Conflict Resoultion 46 (2): 483-507.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War".
American Political Science Review 97 (1): 75-90.
Feldmann, Andreas E., and Maiju Perala. 2004. "Recessing the Causes of
Nongovernmental terrorism in Latin America". Latin American Politics and
Society 46 (2): 101-132.
Fjelde, Hanne. 2009. "Buying Peace?: Oil Wealth, Corruption, and Civil War 19851999". Journal of Peace Research 46 (2): 199-218.
Flanigan, Shawn T. 2008. "Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The
Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 :
499-519.

86
Fredricksson, Per G., and Jakob Svenson. 2003. "Political Instability, Corruption and
Policy Formation: The Case of Environmental Policy". Journal of Public
Economics 87 : 1383-1405.
Ganor, Boaz. 2002. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another's Freedom
Fighter?". Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 3 (4) (2010):
287-304.
Goldstone, Jack, Robert H. Bates, Ted R. Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay
Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2005. A Global Forecasting Model of Political
Instability. State Failure Task Force.
Goodwin, Jeff. 2006. "A Theory of Categorical Terrorism". Social Forces 84 (4): 20272046.
Grynkewich, Alexus G. 2008. "Welfare and Warfare: How Violent Non-state groups use
Social Services to Attack the State". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 : 350370.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, eds.
Ciaran Cronin, Pablo de Greiff. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hamzeh, A. Nazar. 1993. "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to
Parliamentary Accommodation". Third World Quarterly 14 (2): 321-337.
Hegre, Havard, Tanya Ellingson, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. "Toward a
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War. 18161992". American Political Science Reiview 95 : 33-48.
Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York, New York: Columbia University
Press.

87
Hultman, Lisa. 2012. "Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the 'Achilles Heel' of
Democratic Governments". International Interactions 38 : 164-181.
Iqbal, Zaryab, and Harvey Starr. 2008. "Bad Neighbors: Failed States and Their
Consequences". Conflict Management and Peace Science 25 : 315-331.
Jackman, Simon, and Shawn Treier. 2008. "Democracy as a Latent Variable". The
American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 201-217.
King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. "Improving Forecasts of State Failure". World
Politics 53 (4): 623-658.
Krasner, Stephen D., and Carlos Pascual. 2005. "Addressing State Failure". Foreign
Affairs 84 (4): 153-163.
Krieger, Tim, and Daniel Meierireks. 2008. "What Causes Terrorism?". Public Choice
147 : 3-27.
Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is
There a Causal Connection?". Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (4): 1194144.
Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism".
International Security 31 (1): 49-80.
Li, Quan. 2005. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist
Incidents?". Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2): 278-297.
Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. 2004. "Economic Globalization and Transnational
Terrorism: A Pooled Time-series Analysis". Journal of Conflict Resoultion 48 (2):
230-258.

88
Linberg, Jo-Eystein. 2008. Running on Faith? A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of
Religious Cleavages on the Intensity and Duration of Internal Conflict. PhD.,
University of Oslo.
Masters, Jonathan, and Zachary Laub. 2014. "Hezbollah". CFR Backgrounders.
Milliken, Jennifer, and Keith Krause. 2002. "State Failure, State Collapse, and State
Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies". Development and Change 33
(5): 753-774.
Ndulu, Benno, Stephen O'Connel, Robert Bates, Paul Collier, Chukwuma Soludo, JeanPaul Azam, and Augustin Fosu, eds. 2007. The Political Economy of Economic
Growth in Africa, 1960–2000. Vol. 2.
Nepstad, Sharon E. 2013. "Mutiny and Non-violence in the Arab spring: Exploring
Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria". Journal of Peace
Research 50 (3): 337-349.
Norton, Augustus Richard. 2014. Hezbollah: A Short History. 6th ed. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Nuedorfer, Natasha S., and Ulrike G. Theuerkauf. 2014. "Buying War not Peace: The
Influence of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic War". Comparative Political
Studies 47 (13): 1856-1886.
Pape, Robert A. 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism". American Political
Science Review 97 (3): 343-361.
Patrick, Stewart. 2008. "U.S. Policy Toward Fragile States: An Integrated Approach to
Security and Development". In The White House and the World: A Global
Development Agenda for the Next U.S. President., ed. Nancy Birdsall, 327-353.

89
Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institution Press.
———. 2007. "'Failed' States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy
dilemmas". International Studies Review 9 (4): 644-662.
Piazza, James A. 2011. "Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination, and Domestic
Terrorism". Journal of Peace Research 48 (3): 339-352.
———. 2008. "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational
Terrorism?". International Studies Quarterly 52 : 469-488.
———. 2007. "Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and
Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30 :
521-539.
———. 2006. "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social
Cleavages". Terrorism and Political Violence 18 : 159-177.
Potter, Donald W. 2004. "State Responsibility, Sovereignty, and Failed States". Paper
presented at Austrailian Political Science Association Conference, University of
Adelaide.
Primoratz, Igor. 2013. Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation. Malden, MA: Polity
Press.
Renwick, Danielle, and Stephanie Hanson. 2014. "FARC, ELN: Columbia's Left Wing
Guerrillas". CFR Backgrounders.
Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil War". Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46 (1): 29-54.
Ross, Michael. 2006. "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War". The Annual
Review of Political Science 9 : 265-300.

90
Rotberg, Robert I. 2003. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators". In State failure and state weakness in a time of terror., ed. Robert I.
Rotberg, 1-28. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press.
———. 2002a. "The New Nature of Nation-state Failure". Washington Quarterly 25 (3):
85-96.
———. 2002b. "Failed States in a World of Terror". Foreign Affairs 81 (4): 127-140.
Rothschild, Joseph. 1977. "Observations on Political Legitimacy in Modern Europe".
Political Science Quarterly 92 (3): 487-501.
Sambianis, Nicholas, and Havard Hegre. 2006. "Sensitivity Analysis on Empirical
Results on Civil War Onset". Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4): 508-535.
Santifort, Charlinda, Todd Sandler, and Patrick Brandt. 2012. "Terrorist Attack and
Target Diversity: Changepoints and Their Drivers". Journal of Peace Research
50 (1): 75-90.
Skocpol, T. 1979. States and Social Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press.
Taylor, Andrew. 2013. State Failure. Global Issues., ed. Jim Whitman. New York, New
York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Thies, Cameron G. 2010. "Of Rules, Rebels, and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War
Onset, and Primary Commodities". Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): 321-332.
Weigand, Krista E. 2009. "Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese
Political Party". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 (8): 669-680.

91
Wilson, Matthew, and James A. Piazza. 2013. "Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning
Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks". The American
Journal of Political Science 57 (4): 941-955.
Zaidi, S. Akbar. 1999. "NGO failure and the need to bring back the state". Journal of
International Development 11 (2): 259-271.

